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Fleet Battle Experiment – Juliet (FBE-J) was conducted at the operational and tactical levels from 24 July 
to 15 August 2002 in the US western sea and land ranges and in conjunction with Millenium Challenge 
2002 MC02). MC02 had no impact on FBE-J other than to provide, at times, JFC initiation to operational 
and tactical actions through the effects tasking order (ETO). Thus, there is no reference to MC02 in this 
report's results.  
 
The experiment setting time frame was 2007. This limited experimentation to those capabilities resident 
in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) in 2002 or those capabilities that could be reasonably 
achieved by 2007. 
 
FBE-J attempted to include almost every maritime warfare area. The scenario supported experimentation 
in strike, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, anti-surface warfare, information operations, naval fires, 
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Additional initiatives examined high-speed vessels; 
joint Fires, sea based command and control, coalition command and control, netted force, meteorology 
and oceanography, and human factors. 
 
A primary goal was to enable commanders to make fast, accurate planning and execution decisions. The 
range of information-related objectives has been broad, including battlefield situation, information 
accuracy, timeliness, dissemination and display, and the processes by which the information is used for 




The following principal results have been extracted from the Fleet Battle Experiment -Juliet (FBE-J) 
Reconstruction and Analysis Report's key observations. These are a fraction of the results that were 
obtained from the experiment. They are deemed to be the most significant for reasons such as operational 
impact, and priority for further study. These results have been developed under conditions that existed 
during FBE-Juliet. Whether they are applicable outside those conditions is speculative. 
 
The maritime planning process (MPP) was implemented by a staff structure under the Joint Forces 
Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC). Effects tasking orders (ETOs) from the Joint Forces 
Commander (JFC) were ingested, and maritime tasking orders (MTOs) were produced and coordinated 
with the air tasking order (ATO). Principal warfare commanders (PWCs) participated in the process, 
producing maritime support requests (MARSUPREQs) that were a component of MTO production. Three 
overlapping planning cycles of 72-hours each were simultaneously executed. The process executed all 
required tasks and produced required products.  
  
It was observed that the MPP is potentially viable, but also observed was that the process did not go well, 
even without stressing the process. The three simultaneous planning cycles and the high level of 
synchronization needed between tasks, information, and individuals led to poor planning and poor 
personnel utilization. Additional analyses and  process modeling should be conducted in order to improve 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the MPP process before formalizing the implementation of the MPP. 
 
FBE-J included an evaluation of surrogate high speed vessels (HSV) and their potential applicability to 
support Navy missions. The HSVs were highly reconfigurable. During the experiment HSV-X1 was 
reconfigured five times, with time to achieve reconfiguration never more than one-half day. It was tested 
as a command and control (C2) platform for Mine Warfare Command (MIWC) as well as for mine 
countermeasures (MCM) operations, Navy Special Warfare (NSW), intra-theater lift/movement of a 
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brigade combat team unit, and a sensor management platform. Opportunities arose during the experiment 
to provide support for helicopters, small boats, unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), and unmanned 
underwater vehicles (UUVs). HSV-X1 conducted MIWC, MCM, and ship-to-objective-maneuver 
(STOM) operations simultaneously, while also functioning as a forward deployed sensor management 
plus command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) platform. It was concluded that the HSV would make an excellent MIW support vessel. 
 
A subset of possible HSV simultaneous multi-mission support was executed during the experiment. 
Multi-mission support with a small platform works, but the extent to which such support can be provided 
is not known. While a single ship can perform two or more missions simultaneously, it is not known 
which multi-mission combinations are most efficient and how these may contribute to mission planning 
conflicts. This needs to be determined as part of developing multi-mission tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTP). 
 
There were two other findings regarding HSVs.  The physical vulnerabilities of these ships to a wide 
range of fires are not understood but need to be before development of TTP on their use in combat. Also, 
comparisons of data taken on the HSV with data previously obtained indicate that the quantity and quality 
of sleep are substantially less than that of USN recruits during boot camp and sailors working nights 
during combat. Current human factors research indicates such sleep patterns lead to greatly increased risk 
of mishaps due to lapses in attention and fatigue. 
 
In anti-submarine warfare (ASW), common tools, networked to common data sources, provided support 
for distributed, collaborative planning and produced a shared understanding of the undersea environment. 
Production and use of an ASW Common Undersea Picture (CUP) is viable and will enhance ASW 
capabilities. The CUP enabled collaborative planning of optimal search patterns and monitoring of 
execution. Connectivity between submarines and other combatants is a significant limitation. Bandwidth 
and connectivity must both be considered for a solution.  Chat was one of the primary collaboration tools 
and used extensively. Efficient collaboration by this means appears to require almost full-time 
monitoring. This has an impact on personnel resources and work planning. There are no business rules for 
who may provide information or for controls on information content.  
 
Bottom-moored acoustic arrays, unmanned surface vehicles, and submarine-locating devices (SLD) 
provided valuable information for localization and attack prosecution in ASW.  
The use of the Naval Fires Network - Experimental (NFN (X)) systems, especially the Land Attack 
Warfare System (LAWS) and the Global Command and Control System – Maritime (GCCS-M), for 
ASW engagements was also  investigated. Opinions about the usefulness of these systems are mixed.  
The usefulness of this approach is not known for situations where there are simultaneous, intensive 
operations, such as air and ASW. Ultimately, tests will have to be undertaken under expected battle 
rhythm and conditions. 
 
In the Joint Fires Initiative, the JTF and components were able to manage time sensitive targets (TSTs) 
and track progress across the full engagement cycle using the Automated Deep Operations Coordination 
System (ADOCS). The system provided an understanding of the overall joint TST operation and 
improved confidence in Fires decision-making. It also aided in deconfliction of fires and the avoidance of 
fratricide.  
 
The Dynamic Target List (DTL) manager provided effective cross-component Fires coordination, but 
TTP problems exist. Evidence includes the number of targets engaged and the degree to which all 
components contributed to the DTL manager display. However, departures from established TTP, which 
can interfere with coordination, were observed. 
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The the median time elapsed from receipt of a target nomination in ADOCS until a weapon was fired was 
33 minutes. This interval does not necessarily include target mensuration time. The median time from a 
TST nomination to weapon release was 60 minutes.  The geo-refinement interval (29 min) was 
lengthened compared to previous experiments due to the validation process.  In addition, autonomous 
TST engagements were not permitted; therefore all TST timelines include a JFMCC decision/evaluation 
interval. 
 
Fully autonomous NFN (X) engagements were not possible because the JFMCC maintained approval and 
platform assignment control of TSTs and because of the TST system architecture, which required all 
mensuration requests to pass through a single Dynamic Target Management System (DTMS) workstation. 
Both system and process changes are required to enable autonomous engagement with NFN (X).  The 
TST CONOPS and system architecture must permit autonomous engagements, both as a fall back 
position in a centralized system for communications failures and to improve the chances of successfully 
engaging short dwell time TSTs.  
 
One of the principal uses of LAWS is as a Fires manager for TSTs. Past experiments have concentrated 
on this use. This use was expanded in FBE-J. The result was diminished utility for TST management.  In 
this experiment, the manager was also populated with ship-self-defense, mine, submarine, test targets, air 
tasking orders (ATOs), and call-for-fire missions.  Some TST targets were passed to other components, 
and their actions and resultant engagements were not reported in LAWS. This may have been due to 
insufficient personnel for the additional workload, confusion with the additional objects displayed, or 
insufficient training for the expanded usage. 
 
Development is needed to produce geo-refinement TTP.  For short dwell-time targets, time is of the 
essence and targets must be mensurated immediately, prior to weapon-target pairing. For longer dwell 
time targets, mensuration should not be requested until after weapon-target pairing so as to determine 
whether target geo-refinement is required.  
 
Overall, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) management improved, but shortfalls 
remain. The ISR operations cell in the maritime operations cell (MOC) was effective in dynamic re-
tasking of ISR assets.  But, there was not an established process to assess the effects on the deliberate ISR 
plan when sensors were re-tasked to support TST operations. There was no confirmation that there was 
“seamless” ISR coverage of the area of operations.  Apparently tools, TTP, and sufficient personnel are 
lacking to enable full-spectrum ISR operations. Considerable investigation is needed to understand 
requirements.  
 
The Tactical Exploitation System – Navy (TES-N) excelled at display of near-real-time location of Red 
assets for decision makers. The system can be effective but issues concerning integration of this system 
with other systems, lack of a direct downlink, communications connectivity reliability, and the sharing of 
data between systems need to be resolved.  
 
Track information from the common operational picture (COP) displayed during the experiment on the 
Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M) system varied on different platforms. The 
extent and magnitude of inconsistencies are not known.  A methodology needs to first be developed to 
ensure valid data. Effort should be expended on development of means to examine COP validity in 
general and highlight critical targets such as TCTs. 
 
The Micro-Internetted Unmanned Ground System (MIUGS) provided information to augment the COP.  
MIUGS sent the wrong coordinates and tracks sent did not match the actual target location. Thus, MIUGS 
data could not be used for precision strike. There were also large inconsistencies between reported 
MIUGS performance, ranging from everything worked perfectly to there being substantial errors in 
tracking and the passing of data from one system to another.  
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The engagement of mine targets in LAWS possible but additional process development is needed. The 
concept of feeding mine contacts into LAWS and engaging them through that system appears workable. 
Procedures need to be simplified and codified. Mine nominations should be treated like other target 
nominations within LAWS, i.e., mine nomination weapon-target paired and the engagement conducted 
within the mine nomination entry in the LAWS Fires manager.  
 
HSV appears to be an excellent platform for supporting MIW.  Its advantages include: high speed to area 
of operations and while conducting various MIW missions; shallow draft to allow operations in relatively 
shallow water; and large cargo volume that can provide ample workspace and support areas for 
supporting future RAVs and their operational mission and maintenance crews. Disadvantages and risks 
include: potential vulnerability of the HSV to hostile fire due to its aluminum composition and small 
crew; the loss of one HSV with large number of RAVs (est. 25 to 30) could risk the entire MIW mission 
success and/or timeline if additional resources are not readily available; and under the concept of rapid 
reconfiguration for HSVs, MIW may be competing with other missions for the use of the HSV.  
 
JFMCC management of MIW is a challenge that presently strains players on all sides. The reasons for 
this include that MIW missions are longer than typical JFMCC missions and may not be suitably 
managed within the overall JFMCC process at present. This is a resource allocation issue, as the JFMCC 
staff may reallocate HSVs and other resources after the expiration of the 24-hour MTO/ATO, but MIW 
missions initiated during the valid period may still be on-going, due to the length of some MIW 
missions.It was also observed that the ATO tasking vehicles are not optimal for MIW missions and direct 
tasking of platforms in MIW is preferable to the indirect tasking associated with the use of mission 
support requests (MSRs). 
 
Remote autonomous vehicles (RAVs) offer tremendous potential for rapid, effective, and covert MIW 
operations to ensure assured access to hostile territory. Future HSVs could host 25 to 30 of these RAVs 
per HSV. The management of a multiplicity of these systems, possibly among several HSVs will be far 
more complex than anything experienced to date in MIW or demonstrated in FBE-J. There was no 
stressing of the RAV systems in FBE-J, so no assessment can be made of problems or issues that will 
arise when one HSV attempts to manage, control, and exploit a number of these systems. 
 
In information operations (IO), a hardened client successfully deflected direct Red team attacks through 
operating system (OS) wrappers and autonomic distributed firewall (ADF) configuration. The Red team 
was not successful in achieving the goal of disrupting time critical targeting during attack periods. 
 
Operational commanders required the capability to launch theater-level, information attacks when 
appropriate. The offensive information operations experiment conducted during FBE-J centered on 
utilizing E-Strike munitions in support of time critical strike scenarios. As FBE-J progressed, kinetic and 
non-kinetic IO Fires were integrated into TST operations.  
 
Decision support information was generally timely and accurate. The knowledge management 
organization (KMO) is effective in reducing uncertainty, increasing situational awareness, decreasing 
information overload, and shortening decision cycles. There was not an active and high-level gleaning of 
information and processing of that information into knowledge needed, at the right time and place, by 
critical decision makers. There exists the possibility of producing accurate information, disseminating it 
widely, and insuring all recipients receive the same information, but having the result be information 
overload because there is not a focus on providing relevant information to those performing specific tasks.  
Information relevancy, and KMO processes to identify and manage information and then keep that 
information relevant to critical decision-makers, would require different organizational and information 
processes than those present in the experiment.  
 
  7  
    
There is a continuing tendency to focus on technical solutions to information dissemination at the expense 
of process. The contribution of KMO to information management was secondary to technical aspects of 
information communications, and its use did not achieve high-level or strategic objectives envisioned. 
The need for the KMO functionality was demonstrated. However, KMO put a significant load on 
available bandwidth that was not taken into account when making operational bandwidth allocation 
decisions.  
 
The collaborative information environment (CIE) was designed to: reduce planning and execution 
timelines; enhance organizational effectiveness for distributed operations; flatten organizational 
hierarchies and decision-making; enable self-synchronization; and integrate ADOCS/LAWS for 
situational awareness in distributed operations. The overall objective was to enable rapid decisive 
operations (RDO) through more efficient integration of information and communications. Technological 
aspects of CIE were achieved with impressive utilization of cutting-edge technologies. SharePoint Portal 
Service (SPPS) integrated critical systems through a portal and application framework that effectively 
reduced planning and execution timelines. 
 
In theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD), the inherent mobility and flexibility of Naval forces 
constituted a unique joint capability and a force multiplier during the experiment. Navy ships protected 
critical assets on the defended assets list (DAL), augmented Patriot units, provided the lower tier 
component for Theater Phase High Altitude Defense (THAAD) system, and projected missile defense 
over amphibious landings ashore. Ships provided a key complement to Army air defense artillery (ADA) 
surging to meet anticipated threats or to respond to other operational changes, while THAAD and 
PATRIOT batteries focused on the defense of fixed critical assets. 
 
The Air Defense Commander/Regional Air Defense Commander (ADC/RADC) was never fully 
integrated into AOC battle rhythm, and the organizational relationship between the Joint Forces Air 
Component Commander/Area Air Defense Commander (JFACC/AADC) and the ADC/RADC remained 
ambiguous. The absence of joint doctrine defining the role of a RADC and the lack of direct 
communication between the JFACC/AADC and the RADC most likely contributed to the difficulty. 
 
Attempts to develop coordinated engagement procedures when both Army and Navy missile defense 
forces covered common critical assets were unsuccessful. Doctrinal and technical differences between 
Army firing units and Navy ships formed a barrier and did not allow coordination beyond spatial 
deconfliction (“engagement zones”). Without changes to existing doctrine, systems, and operational 
concepts, dynamic battlespace coordination including integrated engagements will not be possible.  
 
Though it received less high-level attention than longer-range missiles, the threat posed by large numbers 
of relatively unsophisticated short-range missiles (<300 km) and artillery rockets was a significant factor 
in operational planning and caught many planners by surprise. Coordination between the DAADC and the 
maritime ADC/RADC was hindered, as existing planning tools did not include models for these threats 
and the numbers present required intense considerations of interceptor inventory. The widespread 
distribution of these types of weapons warrants increased consideration in operational planning.  
 
Collaboration was hindered when weapons system decision aid models did not yield common solutions, 
even with identical data input. For distributed collaboration to be effective, all participants must have a 
common understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the individual systems.  
 
  8  
    
 
FBE Status and Recommendations 
 
FBE-J results demonstrate that more attention is needed toward providing information that is relevant to a 
particular task and on designing new decision processes that recognize the new information environment. 
A significant shift from systems to processes is needed, including: 
 
From a common "picture" to a common database from which information is drawn. 
From "common" information to information that is relevant to performing a task. 
From common displays to presenting information in a way that is task pertinent. 
From fitting information to processes to redesigning processes around information. 
 
Achieving transformation will require intelligent agents to fuse and sort information. It will also require 
developing processes that fit the new information environment, which can probably only be done by 
sophisticated process modeling. FBE examination of net-centric concepts needs to move in these 
directions. 
 
Simulation was used to provide event stimulation of FBEs. This is required for a variety of good reasons. 
The underlying physics for events reside in the simulation. From a total system understanding point of 
view, one cannot adequately analyze experiment events without having a complete understanding of what 
is occurring in the simulation. However, this level of understanding is not available to those analyzing 
FBEs.  
 
There is a tendency to bring systems into an FBE with an incomplete overall architecture design. 
Nonetheless, the systems perform fairly well. However, inconsistencies do emerge during an experiment 
and they can obscure the information one is trying to gather. FBEs need a master architect, who has 
appropriate authority, and focuses not only on whether systems will work together but also on whether the 
resulting configuration and use will meet experiment objectives. 
 
In keeping with the net-centric approach, much FBE effort has been expended on the use of information 
for rapid decision-making, with Fires as a major thrust. Adequate testing should include stressing the 
process. To date, FBEs have dealt with environments that are not target rich or do not have large numbers 
of targets to deal with in a short time. Thus, it is not known what performance parameters will be under 
those circumstances, which are critical in actual combat. 
 
Complete planning, engineering, and testing of systems needs to be done before trying to demonstrate 
possible functionality in an FBE. Several FBE-J initiatives relied on or evaluated equipment that failed. 
Examples include the micro-netted unattended ground sensors (MIUGS), ASW remote autonomous 
sensors (RAS), and knowledge kinetics (K2), a work-flow software program that at the technical level 
was successful, but was not integrated in processes to actually do the job it was intended to do. Because 
many initiatives are predicated on the successful operation of equipment or sensor suites, or integration of 
new software (as in the case of K2) new equipment should be given sensibly exhaustive checkouts 
beforehand so there will be reasonable certainty that it will work as advertised when it is expected to be 
operating during the experiment. 
 
It has been argued (incorrectly) that while systems, technology, processes or software may not perform; 
the experiment concept is not at risk. In other words, the thought is expressed that there is autonomy 
between concept and the means to learn more about that concept in an experiment. This is a faulty notion. 
While it may in fact be true that the piece of hardware or software, or perhaps even the system is not the 
point of the experiment, furthering the concept (which is the point) cannot be accomplished in the face of 
inadequate performance of supporting equipment. 
 
  9  
    
ISRM MIUGS and the ASW RAS are examples that warrant description to better illustrate this point. As 
yet, there is no agreement on MIUGS performance emerging from the experiment. Characterizing this 
performance is a necessary component to modeling and supporting the larger concept of which this is a 
part. A thorough check of sensor performance and communication links beforehand would have 
eliminated problems and enhanced what was learned. For the ASW system, robo-skis were understood to 
be a difficult platform on which to place very sensitive sensors, which were designed for stationary 
employment. In another ASW example, modifications to DICASS buoys for use with helicopters moved 
the power source too far from the transducer for adequate performance. Thus, neither experiment could be 
said to adequately support the concept of autonomous sensor employment. Nor was parameterization for 
further experimentation obtained. All three systems could have been matured and tested prior to 
STARTEX in order to achieve a higher order of success. In addition, fielding the deficient systems during 
an FBE did not provide good data on how to improve the systems, thus representing a waste of effort and 
resources. 
 
There are other factors in the complex interrelations of these experiments that are not adequately 
addressed, but would contribute to overall context and performance. An example is the role of logistics. 
FBEs are not realistic in terms of logistics or the use of assets, which leads to artificial or unrealistic 
results. Simulation provides most of the event stimulation necessary to engage experiment systems and 
processes. However, there is very little feedback that incorporates use of metrics to account for logistics 
and expenditures, i.e., how long resupply would take, how many missiles are available in a particular 
ship. In addition to the tracking of expenditures, the quality of those expenditures is not considered. For 
example, if Harpoon missiles were used to destroy motor whaleboats the action would represent a 
tremendous asymmetry in values and a potential future opportunity cost, thus it would be an unrealistic 
action in the real world. 
 
It is likely that the Navy would find value in narrowing the focus of the complex experiments, which will 
also include “not to interfere” demonstrations. Rather than try to do many things, at great expense and 
with insufficient designers, observers, or analysts, it would be better to focus on only a few initiatives and 
do them very well. There must be assurance that this limited number of objectives are all well designed 
(with overall priorities and the ultimate analysis in mind), thoroughly observed and documented, and 
comprehensively analyzed. Additionally, each formal Fleet Battle Experiment should be part of a 
continuing mosaic, designed to build mounting improvement in capability beginning with the highest 
priority processes over a number of years. 
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Section I. Principal Results 
 
 
The following principal results have been extracted from the Fleet Battle Experiment -Juliet (FBE-J) 
Reconstruction and Analysis Report's key observations. They are a fraction of the results that were 
obtained from the experiment. They are deemed to be the most significant for reasons such as operational 
impact, and priority for further study. 
 
These results have been developed under conditions that existed during FBE-Juliet. Whether they are 
applicable outside those conditions is speculative. Section II of this report provides an abbreviated 
description of the general context for the experiment. A more complete description can be found in the 
Reconstruction and Analysis Report. Section III provides a brief description of the context as related to 
any experiment, followed by the specific context that is pertinent for each initiative. These two sections 
will allow one to assess the validity of these principal results and the conditions for which they apply. It 
also allows one to plan the conditions under which further experimentation should be carried out.  
 
Each principal result is presented in two formats. The first format is a set of brief summary points 
presented as in a table. The second is a brief description of each point on the same page. These formats 
can be used for presentations, with the first being projected and the second to verbally describe the 
results. Again, full descriptions of these results can be found in the Reconstruction and Analysis Report.  
  
A semantic difficulty has been encountered in presenting these results. The distinction between a time 
sensitive target (TST) and a time critical target (TCT) has been lost in current common usage. Their 
definitions are: 
 
• TST. A target that is to be attacked by a particular time. Such a target can be on the deliberate 
targeting list.  
 
• TCT. A target that "appears" and must be attacked within a definite time period. This target will 
be on a priority list, but will not be on the deliberate targeting list.  
 
TCTs are a special class of TST. It is important to differentiate because they are managed differently and 
conclusions with respect to the ability to manage them can differ.  
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Maritime Planning Process (MPP) #1 
The maritime planning process (MPP) was implemented by a staff structure under the Joint Forces 
Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC). Effects tasking orders (ETOs) from the Joint Forces 
Commander (JFC) were ingested, and maritime tasking orders (MTOs) were produced and coordinated 
with the air tasking order (ATO). Principal warfare commanders (PWCs) participated in the process, 
producing maritime support requests (MARSUPREQs) that were a component of MTO production. Three 
overlapping planning cycles of 72-hours each were simultaneously executed. The process executed all 
required tasks and produced required products.  
 
Applicability: The range of planning done in the experiment was limited. The range of situations that the 
process can manage is unknown.  
 
• Competition for assets between PWCs was not encountered, thus the process was not stressed.  
• There was no MTO-ATO feedback cycle for plan adjustment. 
• There were no means to determine the quality of planning. 
• Execution results were not fed back into the planning cycle; as no process existed to do this.  
 
It was observed that the MPP is potentially viable, but also observed was that the process did not go well. 
Principal problems and their causes were:  
 
• The need to simultaneously support three planning cycles with a limited number of individuals 
appeared to be a contributing cause for process difficulties. Multi-tasking was required, and there 
was no process for coordinating tasks with individual availability.  
• The MPP process needed a high level of synchronization between tasks, information, and 
individuals, which ultimately developed in an ad-hoc manner.  
• Successive MTO inputs contained essentially the same content, creating the impression of 
resubmission rather than new development. Possible causes could have been the overloading of 
multi-tasked individuals, information synchronization difficulties, or significant differences in the 




• The MPP should be further developed and experimented with prior to implementation. Refer to 
the following MPP principal result for pre-implementation requirements. 
• The MPP synchronization and timing needs to be formalized. 
MPP #1 - The Maritime Planning Process Is Potentially Viable 
 
• All required tasks were executed and required products produced.  
o Full process from ETO ingestion to MTO production executed  
o Three overlapping, 72-hour planning cycles executed simultaneously  
 
• The range of planning done in the experiment was limited.  
o Competition for assets between PWCs was largely nonexistent. 
o Execution results were not fed back into the planning cycle. 
o There was no determination of the plans’ quality. 
 
• Process difficulties need to be addressed.   
o Individuals needed to multi-task; but there is no process for coordinating tasks 
with individual availability.  
o Synchronization was ad-hoc rather than a planned process.  
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Maritime Planning Process (MPP) #2 
 
MPP principal result #1 identifies that the process is viable, that difficulties remain to be resolved, and 
overarching problem areas. The experiment revealed process problems but provided little information 
about how to resolve them.  
 
It is assumed that the MPP will be implemented with staffing that is approximately the same as in FBE-J. 
This means that personnel multi-tasking and synchronization of tasks, supporting information, and the 
identification of the individuals performing tasks will be required.  
 
A process is needed to feed back execution results into all three parallel planning cycles. An effects cell 
and a process for synchronizing its output with planning cells are proposed, and definition of this process 




Further progress with MPP requires detailed mapping of the planning architecture, parameterization of 
planning sub-processes, mapping of planning decision processes and information flows that support 
decision-making, and better personnel assignments to tasks. This can be accomplished by process 
modeling. Specifically:  
 
• Develop a detailed MPP process model. This should be done for both the system tested in FBE-J 
and for the eventual operational system that will be needed for adequate MPP execution. 
• Parameterize the model with data from FBE-J and JFMCC limited objective experiments (LOEs). 
Run the model to identify principal process shortfalls.  
• Determine, from a model, how to synchronize the process and identify requirements.  
• Determine MPP personnel and multi-task coordination requirements.  
• Determine how to use an effects cell to synchronize the asynchronous feedback from execution.  
 
MPP #2 - MPP Implementation Study Needed 
 
• Little information is available for MPP improvement.   
 
• Further progress with MPP requires: 
o Detailed mapping of the planning architecture 
o Parameterization of planning sub-processes 
o Mapping of planning decision processes 
o Mapping of information flows that support planning and decisions 
o Better personnel assignments to tasks 
 
• Process modeling is required.  
o Develop a detailed MPP process model 
o Parameterize the model with data from FBE-J and other experiments 
o Determine from model simulation runs how to synchronize the process 
o Determine MPP personnel requirements and multi-task coordination 
o Determine how to synchronize asynchronous feedback from execution 
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High Speed Vessel (HSV) #1 
 
During the experiment HSV-X1 was reconfigured five times, with time to achieve reconfiguration never 
more than one-half day. It was tested as a command and control (C2) platform for Mine Warfare 
Command (MIWC) as well as for mine countermeasures (MCM) operations, Navy Special Warfare 
(NSW), intra-theater lift/movement of a brigade combat team unit, and a sensor management platform. 
Opportunities arose during the experiment to provide support for helicopters, small boats, unmanned 
surface vehicles (USVs), and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). 
 
A subset of possible HSV missions was tested during the experiment. The full range of missions an HSV 
can support, and the numbers of ships needed to support a particular mission are not yet known. 
Reconfiguration works, but will have differing difficulties and times to accomplish, dependent on specific 
missions with associated overlaps and conflicts.  
 
An operation may involve more than one HSV. Varying numbers of ships will be involved in a range of 
missions within the operation. The number of ships to be reconfigured, and the schedule, will depend on 




Studies should be undertaken immediately to determine: 
 
• Reconfiguration profiles, their levels of difficulty, resource needs, and times to accomplish  
• Numbers of ships needed to support various types and scopes of operations 
• Fits between reconfiguration schedules and potential phases of maritime operations 
• Concept of operations (CONOPS) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for HSV use and 
reconfiguration for littoral warfare  
• Optimal reconfiguration profiles necessary to minimize the required number of ships in operation. 
 
 HSV #1 - HSV Rapid Reconfiguration For Different Missions Is Viable 
 
• HSV reconfiguration was accomplished for: 
o C2 platform for MIWC and MCM operations 
o Navy Special Warfare 
o Intra-theater lift/movement of a brigade combat team unit 
o Sensor management platform  
o Support for helicopters, small boats, USVs, and UUVs 
 
• Five reconfigurations accomplished, time for each less than one-half day  
 
• Further tests for more configurations and operations needed: 
o Reconfiguration profiles, their difficulty levels, resource needs, and times to 
accomplish 
o Fits between reconfiguration profiles and likely phases of maritime operations 
o CONOPS and TTP for HSV use and reconfiguration for littoral warfare  
o Numbers of ships needed to support various operations 
o Optimal reconfiguration profiles to minimize the required number of ships  
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High Speed Vessel (HSV) #2 
 
During the experiment HSV-X1 conducted MIWC, MCM, and ship-to-objective-maneuver (STOM) 
operations simultaneously, while also functioning as a forward deployed sensor management plus 
command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
platform.  
 
A subset of possible HSV simultaneous multi-mission support was executed during the experiment. 
Multi-mission support with a small platform works, but the extent to which such support can be provided 
is not known.  
 
A single ship can perform two or more missions simultaneously. However, it is not known which multi-
mission combinations are most efficient and how these may contribute to mission planning conflicts. This 
needs to be determined as part of developing multi-mission tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). 
 
How the Navy would use more than one ship to support several missions, and coordinate their activities 
has not been investigated. A combination of single-mission and multi-mission HSVs could be the 
preferred option. 
 
Coordination of the activities of all HSVs will be required. Planning such coordination would be a part of 
the MPP, would necessarily involve the HSVs, resulting in a distributed JFMCC. Standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) for command and control (C2) of multiple HSVs operating in the littoral, with an HSV 




Studies should be undertaken to determine: 
 
• Simultaneous multi-mission support for various phases of maritime operations 
• Manning and training required for support of single-ship multi-mission capabilities 
• Information exchange and coordination requirements for multi-ship simultaneous missions 




 HSV #2 - HSV is Able to Operate as a Simultaneous, Multi-Mission Platform 
 
• HSV-X1 simultaneously conducted MIWC, MCM, and STOM operations.  
 
• A subset of possible HSV simultaneous missions was executed. Outstanding questions: 
o Efficient single ship multi-mission profiles 
o How more than one ship would support several missions  
o How to coordinate multi-missions within and between HSVs  
 
• Undertake studies to determine: 
o Simultaneous multi-mission support for various phases of maritime operations 
o Manning and training required to support single-ship multi-mission capabilities
o Information exchange and coordination requirements for multi-ship 
simultaneous missions 
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High Speed Vessel (HSV) #3 
 
Questions emerged about HSV vulnerabilities, even possibly to small arms fire. No information was 
obtained during the experiment to address this issue. 
 
HSV operations include the littorals. This will put it within range of numerous threats in addition to those 
normally faced by Navy ships: shore batteries, small surface and air craft, hand-held launchers, small 
arms, etc. Threats can emerge rapidly, with little warning. Protection systems and processes that allow 
rapid reaction are needed.  
 




Conduct a study to:  
 
• Determine threats that are likely to be encountered by an HSV operating in the littoral. 
• Determine the vulnerabilities of the current HSV to these threats. 
• Suggest the capabilities, including those in damage control, needed for new HSV designs. 
 




HSV #3 - HSV Vulnerabilities Not Understood 
 
• Questions emerged about HSV vulnerabilities, even possibly to small arms fire  
 
• No information was obtained during the experiment to address this issue. 
 
• A study should be conducted to:  
o Determine likely threats to an HSV operating in the littoral 
o Determine HSV vulnerabilities to these threats 
o Develop force protection systems and processes against those threats 
o Test and train to these force protection measures. 
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High Speed Vessel (HSV) #4 
 
Comparisons of data taken on the HSV with data previously obtained indicate that the quantity and 
quality of sleep are substantially less than that of USN recruits during boot camp and sailors working 
nights during combat. Current human factors research indicates such sleep patterns lead to greatly 
increased risk of mishaps due to lapses in attention and fatigue. 
 
These results are preliminary, from a small sample. Factors affecting the data such as the unique motion 
of an HSV have not been taken into account. It is not known if tasks aboard the HSV are more or less 
subject to interference from sleep deprivation. Because of low manning and the fast pace of HSV 
operations, this may be a more critical factor than on other ships, but it is likely to be an important 
consideration in future ship design.  
 
There has as yet, been no comparison of individual HSV tasks with equivalent tasks on other ships. Such 
studies should determine if there are substantial differences in the expectations of how tasks are to be 
performed, as well as a determination of sleep patterns.  
 
It is possible that ship motion and pace of operations could be contributing factors to sleep deprivation. 
Causes are not understood, and their determination must wait until further data are obtained to determine 




• Develop a methodology to determine sleep patterns in the presence of HSV motion. 
• Perform a comprehensive study of HSV sleep patterns. 
• Determine if the pace of HSV duties is unusual with respect to other Navy operations. 
• Compare HSV sleep patterns with those of personnel performing equivalent Navy tasks. 
 
 
HSV #4 - HSV Sleep Patterns May Interfere With Duty Performance 
 
• Sleep quantity and quality were substantially less than sailors working nights during 
combat.  
 
• Small number of test cases studied, factors neglected were:  
o Data normalization due to greater motion of an HSV  
o Whether HSV tasks are more or less subject to interference from sleep 
deprivation  
o Effect of low manning and fast pace of HSV operations  
 
• Studies are needed to:  
o Develop a methodology to account for unique HSV motion.  
o Perform a comprehensive study of HSV crew sleep and activity patterns.  
o Compare HSV crew activity pace to determine if it is unusual with respect to 
other types of Navy ships. 
o Compare HSV sleep patterns with those of personnel performing equivalent 
tasks on other types of Navy ships. 
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Common Operational Picture (COP) #1  
 
During the experiment, track information was displayed on both 3.X and 4.X versions of the Global 
Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M) and on different platforms. There were instances of 
information not being the same on the two versions and between platforms with 3.X. The extent and 
magnitude of inconsistencies are not known.  
 
The causes of the inconsistencies are not known.  
 
A methodology needs to first be developed to ensure valid data. 
 
This observation causes the reliability of the common operational picture (COP) to be questioned. 
However, the significance of this difference is not known, either in terms of the magnitude or potential 
impact on operational decision-making.  
 
Effort should be expended on development of means to examine COP validity in general. It is possible 
that the observations are the result of methodologies used or that they are a result of a technical problem 




• Determine the reason(s) for the differences  
• Determine that the observed differences in the COP are real 
• Determine the appropriate methodology for collecting COP data, defining differences 
(quantitatively) and evaluating causes. 




   
COP #1 - GCCS-M Information Inconsistencies Exist  
 
• GCCS-M versions 3.X and 4.X show inconsistent track information.  
 
• GCCS-M displays on different platforms sometimes showed different information.  
 
• Causes for inconsistencies and the impact of this observation are not known.  
o Reliability of the COP can be questioned.  
o Magnitudes of differences are not known.  
o Potential impact on operational decision-making is not known.  
 
• An immediate study should be undertaken to determine if the differences are real, the 
causes, and methodologies to fix the problem.  
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Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) #1 
 
Common tools, networked to common data sources, provided needed support for distributed, 
collaborative planning. Shared understanding of the undersea environment was produced. Production and 
use of an ASW Common Undersea Picture (CUP) is viable and will enhance ASW capabilities.  
 
Applicability: No information was obtained on use of the CUP in conjunction with, or as part of other 
COP systems, such as GCCS. Possible competitions for bandwidth and personnel attention have not been 
evaluated.  
 
Advantages and limitations of the tools were: 
 
• The CUP enabled collaborative planning of optimal search patterns and monitoring of execution. 
• Connectivity between submarines and the force is a significant limitation. Bandwidth and 
connectivity must both be considered for a solution.  
• Chat was one of the primary collaboration tools and used extensively. Efficient collaboration by 
this means appears to require almost full-time monitoring. This has an impact on personnel 
resources and work planning. 





• Develop a consistent set of TTP, tools, manpower needs, and training for a CUP.  
• Determine bandwidth and connectivity requirements for all platforms participating in ASW.  
• Determine any changes needed in CONOPS for CUP implementation. 
• Determine total system loading for CUP used in conjunction with other information systems. 
• Develop business rules to enforce discipline on chat use.  
 
 
ASW #1 - CUP Tools Provide Needed ASW Support 
 
• Provided shared understanding of environment and support for collaborative planning 
 
• Advantages and limitations of the tools were: 
o Improved planning of optimal search patterns and execution monitoring 
o No information obtained on use in conjunction with or part of COP  
o Connectivity with submarines is a significant limitation  
o Chat monitoring required almost a full-time watch 
o TTP required for efficiency and to control information quality  
 
• Studies should be undertaken to:  
o Develop a consistent set of TTP, tools, manpower needs, and training.  
o Determine bandwidth and connectivity requirements for all platforms.  
o Determine any needed CONOPS changes for CUP implementation. 
o Determine total system loading for CUP used in conjunction with other 
information systems. 
o Develop business rules to enforce discipline on chat use. 
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Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) #2 
 
Bottom-moored acoustic arrays, unmanned surface vehicles, and submarine-locating devices (SLD) 
provided valuable information for localization and attack prosecution.  
 
Advantages and limitations of the tools were: 
 
• Periodic reports from SLD during pre-hostilities provided sufficient information to allow Blue-
force assets to be assigned to search exclusively for unreported submarines.  
• It would be desirable to be able to prompt SLD reports rather than operate on a pre-determined 
schedule. 
• A portion of the success of an Advance Deployable System (ADS) field was due to identifying 
critical locations and choke points for installation of a sensor field ahead of time and 
concentrating installation there. 
• The ability to coordinate USVs with air ASW platforms was demonstrated. 




• Develop a set of seaworthiness and maintainability requirements for USVs and their sensors. 




ASW #2 - Remote Unmanned Sensors Improve ASW Operations 
 
• Sensors utilized: 
o Bottom-moored acoustic arrays  
o Unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) 
o Submarine-locating devices (SLD)  
 
• Advantages and limitations: 
o Pre-hostility SLD reports enabled optimization of Blue-force assets.  
o ADS success requires advanced identification of critical locations and choke 
points.  
o USV sensors did not function as designed. 
o Seaworthiness of USVs and included sensors is an area for further 
development. 
 
• Improved use of these sensors requires: 
o Develop USV and sensor seaworthiness and maintainability requirements. 
o Development of TTP for the coordinated use of various sensors. 
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Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) #3 
 
The use of the Naval Fires Network - Experimental (NFN (X)) systems, especially LAWS and GCCS-M, 
for ASW engagements was investigated. Opinions about the usefulness of these systems are mixed.  
 
There was a pattern to perceptions about the usefulness of these systems. Personnel on platforms that do 
not use the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) and other tactical data links viewed the system as 
providing added value.  
 
The usefulness of this approach is not known for situations where there are simultaneous, intensive 
operations, such as air and ASW. Ultimately, tests will have to be undertaken under expected battle 




• The systems would have greater utility if incorporated into existing submarine weapons control 
systems and/or surface ASW tactical data systems. Dealing with an additional and separate 
system is difficult.  




• Before another round of testing NFN (X) for ASW applications, it is necessary to develop viable 
plans for fusing this information with existing ASW information. 




ASW #3 - NFN (X) Use For ASW Had Limited Success 
 
• LAWS and GCCS-M were used for ASW engagements. 
 
• Non-NTDS platforms realized the most benefit from the system.  
  
• Greater utility would be realized from incorporation into existing submarine weapons 
control systems and/or surface ASW tactical data systems. 
 
• LAWS occasional latency of several minutes is unacceptable for this application.  
 
• Before further testing of NFN (X) for ASW: 
o Develop plans for fusion with existing ASW information. 
o Develop combined information displays. 
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Joint Fires Initiative (JFI) #1 
 
The JTF and components were able to manage TSTs and track progress across the full engagement cycle 
using ADOCS. The system provided an understanding of the overall joint TST operation and improved 
confidence in Fires decision-making. Using the system to visualize the operation aided in deconfliction of 
fires and the avoidance of fratricide.  
 
There were situations in the experiment where interface issues between GCCS-M and the simulation 
prevented a full test of ADOCS use for situational awareness. As a result, it is not possible to use the 
results of this experiment to state an across-the-board improvement or to differentiate those situations for 
which this system does or does not improve situational awareness. 
 
Graphical displays were not used as the primary means for situational awareness. For example, in the 
Maritime Operations Center decisions were being made primarily from the DTL display and IWS chat. It 
is not known if this is because of a deficiency in the displays, greater familiarity with chat, some affinity 
for chat’s use, training insufficiencies, etc. This uncertainty indicates the need to learn more about this use 




• Conduct tests of ADOCS use for situational awareness across a broad TST spectrum. 
• Provide more individual and unit training in order to maximize the contributions of ADOCS.  
• Determine if modifications to graphical displays are needed. 
 
 
JFI #1 - ADOCS Provides Improved Fires Situational Awareness 
 
• ADOCS use demonstrated for TST management and to track engagement progress  
 
• Deconfliction of Fires and fratricide avoidance were improved.  
 
• GCCS-M / simulation interface issues prevented a full test of ADOCS use.  
o Cannot evaluate across-the-board improvement to Fires SA.  
o Cannot differentiate situations for which this system does/does not improve 
SA. 
  
• DTL display and IWS chat were used in lieu of ADOCS graphical displays. 
 
• It is necessary to: 
o Conduct tests of ADOCS use for situational awareness across a broad TST 
spectrum of users and situation. 
o Provide more individual and unit training to maximize ADOCS contributions. 
o Determine if modifications to graphical displays are needed.  
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Joint Fires Initiative (JFI) #2 
 
The DTL manager was a successful cross-component coordination tool. Evidence is the number of targets 
engaged and the degree to which all components contributed to a usually complete and consistent DTL 
manager display. However, departures from established TTP, which can interfere with coordination, were 
observed. 
 
TTP departure examples:  
 
• Targets were passed from nominators who had not indicated an inability to engage.  




• Provide better ADOCS TTP training for operators. 





JFI #2 - DTL Manager Provides Cross-Component Fires Coordination, 
TTP Problems Exist 
 
• DTL Manager was a successful cross-component coordination tool evidenced by: 
o Number of targets engaged 
o Components contributed to a usually complete and consistent display  
 
• Departures from established TTP occurred:  
o Targets were passed from nominators with no indication of inability to engage. 
o MSN block was changed from white to yellow, an undefined action. 
o These departures can interfere with coordination. 
 
• It is necessary to: 
o Provide better ADOCS TTP training for operators. 
o Determine if current TTP are adequate for all TST situations. 
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Joint Fires Initiative (JFI) #3 
 
This is the time elapsed from receipt of a target nomination in ADOCS until weapon firing.  
 
This interval does not necessarily include target mensuration time. The nominating component was 





JFI #3 - 33 Minute Median Interval For ADOCCS Target Prosecution 
 
• Interval is the median elapsed time from receipt of a target nomination in ADOCS until 
weapon firing. 
 
• The elapsed time includes the median time delays for the following processes:  
o Nomination receipt to mission passed 15 min 
o Mission passed to coordination block green  1 min 
o Block green to execution intent   2 min 
o Execution intent to weapon fire  15 min 
  
• Interval may not include mensuration.  
o Nominating component was responsible for mensuration, and may have done 
this before target nomination was received in ADOCS.  
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Naval Fires Network-Experimental (NFN (X)) #1 
 
The TST CONOPS and system architecture must permit autonomous engagements both as a fall back 
position in the face of a centralized system or communications failures and to improve the chances of 
successfully engaging short dwell time TSTs.  
 
Autonomous TST engagements were not possible because the JFMCC MOC maintained approval and 
platform assignment control of TSTs and because of the TST system architecture, which required all 
mensuration requests to pass through a single Dynamic Target Management System (DTMS) workstation. 




• Configure the NFN (X) system so that target nominations, with associated imagery, and 
mensuration requests can be sent directly from the target nominator and the Land Attack Warfare 
System (LAWS), respectively, to the mensuration workstation.  
 
 
NFN (X) #1 - Fully Autonomous NFN (X) Engagements Not Possible  
 
• Autonomous TST engagements were not possible because: 
o The JFMCC MOC maintained TST approval.  
o MOC maintained TST platform assignment control. 
o TST system architecture required all mensuration requests to pass through a 
single DTMS workstation. 
 
• TST CONOPS and system architecture must permit autonomous engagements. 
o As a fall back position in the face of a centralized system or communications 
failures 
o To improve chances of successfully engaging short dwell time TSTs.  
 
• Recommend configuring the system so that the target nominator and LAWS can send:
o Target nominations 
o Associated imagery 
o Mensuration requests directly to the mensuration workstation 
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Naval Fires Network-Experimental (NFN (X)) #2 
 
One of the principal uses of LAWS is as a Fires manager for TSTs. Past experiments have concentrated 
on this use. This use was expanded in FBE-J. The result was diminished utility for TST management.  
 
In this experiment, the manager was also populated with ship-self-defense, mine, submarine, test targets, 
air tasking orders (ATOs), and call-for-fire missions.  
 
Some TST targets were passed to other components, and their actions and resultant engagements were not 
reported in LAWS. 
 
Several causes for this result are possible: 
 
• Lack of personnel for the additional workload 
• Display confusion with the additional objects 
• Lack of training for the expanded usage 
 
Which, or what combination, of these effects is causal is not known. Rather than undertake to determine 




• Restrict the Fires manager to TSTs and create LAWS managers for other classes of targets. 
• When TSTs are passed to other components for execution, and the ADOCS DTL is updated to 
reflect engagement actions, have these status changes automatically update the LAWS Fires 
manager. 
• Establish procedures for target accountability. The action or request originator must be 
responsible for ensuring his action or request was received at the target workstation. This is 
ideally done automatically.  
 
NFN (X) #2 – Diminished LAWS Utility As TST Management Tool 
 
• LAWS Manager was populated with additional, non-TST targets in this experiment, 




o Test targets 
o ATO and call for fire missions 
 
• Some TST targets were passed to other components and their actions and resultant 
engagements were not reported in LAWS.   
 
• System and TTP recommendations:  
o Restrict the Fires Manager to TSTs 
o Create LAWS Managers for other classes of targets  
o Automatic status change updates in the LAWS Fires Manager 
o Establish procedures for target accountability.  
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Naval Fires Network-Experimental (NFN (X)) #3 
 
For short dwell-time targets, time is of the essence and targets must be mensurated immediately, prior to 
weapon-target pairing. A risk in this approach is that target mensuration will not be required and the 
mensuration effort will be wasted. For longer dwell time targets, mensuration should not be requested 
until after weapon-target pairing so as to determine whether target geo-refinement is required.  
 
Factors contributing to process difficulties: 
 
• TST target nominations were almost always received without any indication of the accuracy of 
the reported target location. 
• FBE-J introduced a workstation (DTMS) into the geo-refinement process and a geo-refinement 
validation process that necessitated message exchange between LAWS and DTMS. As a result, it 
required a median of 29 minutes between a LAWS request for mensuration and receipt of the 
mensuration result, compared to a median of less than 10 minutes to obtain the geo-refined target 
position at the geo-refinement workstation. Data show that the validation process made no 
contribution to the geo-refinement process, since the provided target location accuracy was 
unrelated to the requested accuracy.  




• Geo-refinement TTP should depend on the dwell time of the TST.  
• For high priority, short dwell time targets (TCT), mensuration of the target should begin 
immediately, even if the geo-refinement might ultimately prove unnecessary by virtue of the 
weapon-target pairing decision. 
• For non-TCTs, the original target nomination needs to contain an estimate of the accuracy of the 
reported target location. Without this, a reasoned determination of the need for further geo-
refinement subsequent to weapon-target pairing cannot be made.  
• To permit an informed decision on the requirement for a geo-refined target position, target 
nominations should be required to contain an estimate of the accuracy of the reported target 
position. 
• Eliminate the validation procedure. 
• Reconfigure so that LAWS can send geo-refinement requests directly to a mensuration 
workstation. 
 
NFN (X) #3 - Geo-Refinement TTP Development Needed 
 
• The geo-refinement process must be a function of target type: 
o Mensurate short dwell-time targets immediately, prior to weapon-target 
pairing.  
o For longer dwell time targets, request mensuration after weapon-target pairing.  
• Current process difficulties: 
o TST target nominations were almost always received without any indication of 
the accuracy of the reported target location.  
o Geo-refinement validation increased the median processing time from 10 to 29 
minutes. 
o The target location accuracy provided was unrelated to the requested accuracy.
o All requests to pass through the DTMS, a single point of failure.  
• TTP are needed that address directly these processing difficulties. 
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Naval Fires Network-Experimental (NFN (X)) #4 
 




• The geo-refinement interval (29 min) was lengthened compared to previous experiments due to 
the validation process. 







NFN (X) #4 - Median Time, TST nomination To Weapon Release= 60 min 
 
• Represents the median time from receipt of GISRC nomination in LAWS to weapon 
release.  
 
• Median times of included processes are:  
o Generate geo-refinement request 6 min 
o Geo-refinement production           29 min 
o Weapon-Target pairing   5 min 
o Ready to fire decision   6 min 
o Approval to fire   4 min 
o Time to fire             10 min  
  
• TST timelines include a JFMCC decision/evaluation interval.  
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Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Management #1 
 
The ISR operations cell in the MOC was effective in dynamic re-tasking of ISR assets.  
 
There was not an established process to assess the effects on the deliberate ISR plan when sensors were 
re-tasked to support TST operations. There was no confirmation that there was “seamless” ISR coverage 
of the area of operations.  
 
Apparently tools, TTP, and sufficient personnel are lacking to enable full-spectrum ISR operations. 




• Determine manning levels required to provide dedicated cradle-to-grave TST ISR management.  
• Develop a graphic display system to illustrate synchronized ISR planning.  




ISR #1 - ISR Management Improved; Shortfalls Remain 
 
• The ISR Ops Cell in the MOC was effective in dynamic retasking of ISR assets.  
 
• Deficiencies: 
o No established process to assess sensor re-tasking effects.  
o No confirmation of ISR coverage of the area of operations. 
 
• To provide dedicated cradle-to-grave TST ISR management, studies are need to: 
o Determine required manning levels.  
o Develop a graphic display system to illustrate synchronized ISR planning.  
o Develop TTP emphasis on re-tasking and dynamic planning.  
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Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Management #2 
 
The Tactical Exploitation System – Navy (TES-N) excelled at display of near-real-time location of Red 
assets for decision makers. The system can be effective but several issues need to be resolved.  
 
Technical improvements are needed in the following: 
 
• TES-N/NFN lacks effective means for integration with other systems. 
• Lack of direct downlink operations limited NFN system’s TST capability. 
• NFN systems need faster, more reliable communications to deal effectively with TSTs. 





• Develop a means for providing appropriate, near real-time, TES-N information to the Fires cell. 
• Develop a means for displaying TES-N information in GCCS-M. 
• Develop TTP for use of TES-N information in the TST process.  
 
 
ISR #2 - TES-N Can Be An Effective ISR Tool; Further Development Needed 
 
• TES-N excelled at display of near-real-time location of Red assets.  
 
• Limitations: 
o TES-N/NFN lacks effective means for integration with other systems.  
o Lack of direct downlink operations limited NFN system TST capability. 
o NFN needs faster, more reliable communications to deal effectively with
TSTs. 
o There was no TTP for sharing GCCS-M and TES-N information.  
 
• Studies should be undertaken to: 
o Develop a means for providing appropriate, near real-time TES-N information 
to the fires cell. 
o Develop a means for displaying TES-N information in GCCS-M.  
o Develop TTP for use of TES-N information in the TST process.  
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Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Management #3 
 
Most time critical targets in FBE-J were detected or confirmed using imagery from satellite, air, or 
unmanned air reconnaissance operations. The process for nominating these targets for strike currently 
excludes sending such TCT tracks to GCCS-M.  
 
This result applies only to tracks resulting from imagery. DTMS has the requirement to send tracks from 
imagery to the COP. This interface will not be fully implemented until DTMS version 4 (companion with 




• Continue with implementation of requirement already in place. 
 
 
ISR #3 - Time Critical Targets Do Not Appear In The COP 
 
• Most Time Critical Targets in FBE-J were detected or confirmed using: 
o Imagery from satellite 
o Air reconnaissance operations  
o Unmanned air reconnaissance operations  
 
• Target nomination process currently excludes sending TCT tracks to GCCS-M.  
o Applies only to tracks resulting from imagery  
 
• Tracks sent to C2PC from DTMS are also not forwarded to GCCS-M 3.X.  
 
• DTMS has current requirement to send tracks from imagery to the COP.  
o Interface will not be fully implemented until DTMS version 4 (companion with
GCCS-M 4.X). 
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Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Management #4 
 
The Micro-Internetted Unmanned Ground System (MIUGS) provides information to augment the COP. 
GISR-C was requested by MIUGS to nominate a MIUGS target from GCCS-M to LAWS. The exercise 




• MIUGS sent the wrong coordinates to the system. Tracks sent to the system did not match the 
actual target location. Data sent by MIUGS could not be relied on for precision strike.  
• There were large inconsistencies between reported MIUGS performance, ranging from 
everything worked perfectly to there being substantial errors in tracking and the passing of data 








ISR #4 - MIUGS Terminal Was Able To Send Track Data To GCCS-M; 
Reported Results Inconsistent 
 
• MIUGS inputs can be functionally used to identify TCTs to augment the COP.  
 
• Data sent by MIUGS was not reliable for precision strike.  
o MIUGS sent the wrong coordinates; tracks did not match actual target location. 
 
• There were large inconsistencies in reported MIUGS performance:  
o Reports that everything worked perfectly 
o Reports of substantial tracking errors 
o Reports of errors in passing of data from one system to another  
  
• A review of MIUGS results is needed to determine actual versus supposed 
performance. 
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Mine Warfare (MIW) #1  
 
The concept of feeding mine contacts into LAWS and engaging them through that system appears 
workable. Procedures need to be simplified and codified. Mine nominations should be treated like other 
target nominations within LAWS, i.e., mine nomination weapon-target paired and the engagement 
conducted within the mine nomination entry in the LAWS Fires manager. This recommendation conflicts 
to some degree with NFN (X) #2, where a separate manager for non-Fires, i.e. non-time sensitive targets 
was recommended.  
 
The engagement problems were exacerbated and, to a degree caused, by problems with the FASM 




• Develop a methodology that handles mines the same as other targets within LAWS.  




MIW #1 - Engagement Of Mine Targets In LAWS Possible; 
Process Development Needed 
 
• Feeding mine contacts into LAWS and engagement through that system is workable:  
o Procedures need to be simplified. 
o TTP needed. 
 
• Treat mine nominations as another target within LAWS: 
o Mine nomination weapon-target paired 
o Engagement conducted within mine nomination entry in LAWS Fires manager.
 
• Test of the concept is needed using a combination of live mine and other targets.  
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Mine Warfare (MIW) #2 
 
The HSV appears to be an excellent platform for supporting the MIWC and MCM. 
Advantages include: 
• High speed to area of operations and while conducting various MIW missions 
• Shallow draft will allow operations in relatively shallow water 
• Large cargo volume can provide ample workspace and support areas for supporting future 
RAVs and their operational mission and maintenance crews 
Disadvantages and risks include: 
• Potential vulnerability of the HSV to hostile fire due to its aluminum composition and small 
crew 
• Loss of one HSV with large number of RAVs (est. 25 to 30) could risk the entire MIW 
mission success and/or timeline if additional resources are not readily available 
• Under the concept of rapid reconfiguration for HSVs, MIW may be competing with other 




Undertake studies to mature the CONOPS for HSV support of MIW, including  
• Determine the appropriate number and overall distribution of MIW assets on HSVs  
• Assess the requirement for redundant back-up operational databases and MIWC SA in case of 
loss 
• Likelihood that competition for HSV resources will impact on MIW mission success  
 
 
MIW #2– HSV Appears to be Excellent Platform for Supporting MIW 
 
• Advantages include: 
o High speed 
o Shallow draft 
o Large cargo volume to provide future hotel services for support of RAVs and 
mission and maintenance crews 
 
• Disadvantages and risks include: 
o Potential vulnerability of the HSV to hostile fire 
o Loss of one HSV with large number of RAVs (est. 25 to 30) could risk entire 
MIW mission success and/or timeline if additional resources are not readily 
available 
o MIW may have to compete with other missions for the use of the HSV  
 
 
• Studies are needed to mature the CONOPS for HSV support of MIW  
o Determine the appropriate number and distribution of MIW assets on HSVs  
o Assess requirement for redundant back-up operational databases and MIWC SA 
in case of losses 
o Estimate likelihood that competition for HSV resources will impact on MIW 
mission success 
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Mine Warfare (MIW) #3 
 
JFMCC management of MIW is a challenge that presently strains players on all sides. There are several 
reasons for this: 
• MIW missions are longer than typical JFMCC missions and may not be suitably managed 
within the overall JFMCC process at present. This is a resource allocation issue, as the 
JFMCC staff may reallocate HSVs and other resources after the expiration of the 24-hour 
MTO/ATO, but MIW missions initiated during the valid period may still be on-going, due to 
the length of some MIW missions. 
• The ATO tasking vehicles are not optimal for MIW missions 
• Direct tasking of platforms in MIW is preferable to the indirect tasking associated with MSRs 





Conduct studies to  
• Develop a more workable interaction dynamic between JFMCC and MIW 
• Evaluate the impact of lengthy MIW missions on shared resources 
• Evaluate the potential for manpower reductions achievable with automation of data reduction 











MIW #3 – JFMCC is Challenged in Management of MIW 
 
• MIW missions are longer than typical JFMCC MSR missions and may not be 
suitably managed within the overall JFMCC process at present.  . 
• The ATO tasking vehicles are not optimal for MIW missions 
• Direct tasking of platforms in MIW is preferable to the indirect tasking associated 
with MSRs 
• Present reduction of data and the development of tasking is unnecessarily manpower 
intensive 
 
• Studies are needed to: 
o Develop a more workable interaction dynamic between JFMCC and MIW 
o Evaluate the impact of lengthy MIW missions on shared resources and vice versa
o Evaluate the potential for manpower reductions with automation of data reduction 
and tasking in MIW 
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Mine Warfare (MIW) #4 
 
Remote Autonomous Vehicles (RAVs) offer tremendous potential for rapid, effective, and covert MIW 
operations to ensure assured access to hostile territory. Future HSVs could host 25 to 30 of these RAVs 
per HSV. The management of a multiplicity of these systems, possibly among several HSVs will be far 
more complex than anything experienced to date in MIW or demonstrated in FBE-J. There was no 
stressing of the RAV systems in FBE-J, so no assessment can be made of problems or issues that will 
arise when one HSV attempts to manage, control, and exploit a number of these systems. 
 
Potential issues include: 
• Data should be retrievable in or near real-time so as not to delay follow-on planning actions 
• More complicated management and control can be expected  
• The present inability to operate in kelp requires additional engineering to RAVs to reduce 
potential risks and mission impairment 
• Launching and retrieval of RAVs should be accomplished at reasonably high speeds 
 
Recommendations 
• Assess methods to optimize the receipt and management of data 
• Develop reliable ways to control and minimize potential interference of multiple systems 
operating concurrently 
• Re-engineer systems to reduce or eliminate their present vulnerability to kelp 
• Investigate alternative approaches to launching and retrieving RAVs at high speed 
 
MIW #4 --- RAVs are the Future in MIW 
 
• Remote Autonomous Vehicles (RAVs) offer advantages in speed, effectiveness, and 
covertness.  HSVs will be able to host 25 to 30 systems per HSV 
 
• Potential issues 
o Data should be retrieved in or near real-time 
o More complicated management and control  
o Present inability to operate in kelp requires additional engineering 
o Launching and retrieval should be done at high speeds 
 
• Studies are needed to: 
o Assess methods to optimize the receipt and management of data 
o Develop reliable ways to control multiple systems operating concurrently 
o Re-engineer systems to reduce or eliminate their present vulnerability to kelp
o Investigate alternative approaches to launching and retrieving RAVs at high 
speed 
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Information Operations (IO)#1  
 
A hardened client successfully deflected direct Red team attacks through operating system (OS) wrappers 
and autonomic distributed firewall (ADF) configuration. The Red team was not successful in achieving 




• First layer: safe e-mail wrappers blocked harmful behavior contained in e-mail attachment macros 
sent by Red team participants.  
• Second layer: ADF prevented outbound file transfer protocol (FTP) as well as outbound root shell 
jump point. ADF demonstrated an effective defensive technology that can be scaled to full 




• ADF equipped machines were easily detected using basic scans. A network with only partial 
ADF coverage would permit quick identification of unequipped computers and an attack from 
that point.  
• Configuration management issues associated with incorporating ADF cards in all network 
machines include; scalability, the ability of one person to manage 1000+ systems, legacy and 
custom software applications complications, and the correlation of audits across policy servers 




• Develop a policy for ADF equipage as a function of network and machine. 
 
 
IO #1 - Hardened Client Defeated Red-Team Attack. 
 
• Hardened client successfully deflected direct Red team attack using: 
o Layer 1, e-mail wrappers blocked behavior contained in e-mail attachment 
macros.  
o Layer 2, ADF prevented outbound FTP as well as outbound root shell jump 
point.  
 
• ADF was an effective defensive technology scalable to full operational deployment, 
however:  
o ADF equipped machines easily detected using basic scans.  
o Partial ADF coverage permits quick identification of unequipped computers 
and an attack from that point.  
 
• Configuration management issues associated with all machines containing ADF cards: 
o Scalability; ability to manage 1000+ systems 
o Legacy and custom software applications complications 
o Correlation of audits across policy servers for incident handling 
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Information Operations (IO) #2 
 
Operational commanders required the capability to launch theater-level, information attacks when 
appropriate. The offensive information operations experiment conducted during FBE-J centered on 
utilizing E-Strike munitions in support of time critical strike scenarios. As FBE-J progressed, kinetic and 




• Placing control of information operation weapons with the operational commander is critical for 
synchronizing kinetic and non-kinetic warfare. 
• E-strike weapons were not loaded in TBMCS. This had a negative impact on weapon use in the 
Strike Warfare Commander (STWC) planning effort (30-50 percent of planned missions came 




• Operational commanders should control IO weapons systems. 










IO #2 - E-Strike Munitions Extensively Used. 
 
• Kinetic and non-kinetic IO Fires were integrated into TST operations.  
 
• Control of IO weapons by the operational commander is critical for synchronizing 
kinetic and non-kinetic warfare. 
 
• E-strike weapons not being in TBMCS had a negative impact on weapon use planning.
 
 
  39  























Netted Force (NF) and Knowledge Management (KM) #1 
 
Decision support information was timely and accurate. The knowledge management organization (KMO) 
is effective in reducing uncertainty, increasing situational awareness, decreasing information overload, 
and shortening decision cycles. An effective technical process was responsible for information reaching 
critical decision-makers. There was not an active and high-level gleaning of information and processing 
of that information into knowledge needed, at the right time and place, by critical decision makers.  
 
There exists the possibility of producing accurate information, disseminating it widely, and insuring all 
recipients receive the same information, but having the result be information overload because there is not 
a focus on providing relevant information to those performing specific tasks.  
 
Information relevancy, and KMO processes to identify and manage information and then keep that 
information relevant to critical decision-makers, would require different organizational and information 
processes than those present in the experiment.  
 
There is a continuing tendency to focus on technical solutions to information dissemination at the expense 
of process. The contribution of KMO to information management was secondary to technical aspects of 




• Determine required information content as a function of task and situation. 
• Develop a system that filters information into relevant blocks, with attendant targeted 
dissemination. 
NF/KM #1 - KMO Achieved Technical But Not Organizational Objectives 
 
• Knowledge management operations were a technical success: 
o Decision support information was timely and accurate 
o Reduced uncertainty 
o Increased situational awareness 
o Shortened decision cycles. 
 
• Organizational/process inadequacies:  
o Lack of high-level gleaning of information 
o Information not processed into knowledge needed, at the right time and place, 
by critical decision makers. 
 
• Indiscriminate distribution threatens information overload. 
o Shift focus to providing relevant information, correlated to task.  
 
• Required development:  
o Shift of focus from technical to process solutions.  
o Determine required information content as a function of task and situation. 
o System that filters information into relevant blocks with targeted dissemination. 
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Netted Force (NF) and Knowledge Management (KM) #2 
 
The need for the KMO functionality was demonstrated. However, KMO put a significant load on 
available bandwidth that was not taken into account when making operational bandwidth allocation 
decisions.  
 
Utilization of the servers, applications, and communication processes within the infrastructure was not 
optimized. More effective and detailed TTP in this area are required if the potential benefits from KMO 




• Determine expected utilization of KMO systems as a function of operational situation.  
• Develop a services prioritization scheme for KMO utilization. 
• Determine KMO resources required for maximum load. 
 
 
NF/KM #2 - KMO Stressed Communication, Computing, Display Resources 
 
• KMO stressed available resources. TTP are needed to optimize: 
o Bandwidth allocation  
o Server utilization 
o Application utilization 
o Communication utilization 
 
• Studies are needed to:  
o Determine expected utilization of KMO systems as a function of operational 
situation.  
o Determine KMO resources required for maximum load. 
o Develop a services prioritization scheme for KMO utilization.  
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Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) #1 
 
The collaborative information environment (CIE) was designed to: reduce planning and execution 
timelines; enhance organizational effectiveness for distributed operations; flatten organizational 
hierarchies and decision-making; enable self-synchronization; and integrate ADOCS/LAWS for 
situational awareness in distributed operations. The overall objective was to enable rapid decisive 
operations (RDO) through more efficient integration of information and communications. Technological 
aspects of CIE were achieved with impressive utilization of cutting-edge technologies. SharePoint Portal 
Service (SPPS) integrated critical systems through a portal and application framework that effectively 
reduced planning and execution timelines. 
 
Portal/browser structure: The integration of JFMCC components was accomplished through standardized 
applications within the portal framework. Most component information was present within a browser-
based application that could be viewed in a cell and across cells, from any network access point. The 
common relevant operational picture (CROP), secondary information relevant to the COP, was available 




• Workflow automation routines that would send pertinent information to appropriate personnel for 
action and provide automated routing through the chain of command have not yet been integrated 
into the process. 
• SPPS provided an integrated, customizable interface into pertinent information, but not all 
information or communication systems were compatible with portal interfaces or display 
technologies. 
• Search and retrieval functions appeared operational but not comprehensive or well used. 
• IWS and IRC collectively provided means for communication and collaboration, albeit the 




• Continue development of CIE with increased focus on reduction in number of required 
environments.  
• Develop TTP and training programs, and institute them for CIE use.  
CIE #1 - Collaborative Information Environment Technical Objectives Achieved 
 
• SPPS integrated critical systems through a portal and application framework. 
o Planning and execution timelines reduced 
o More efficient integration of information and communications 
o Enabled flattened organizational hierarchies and decision-making 
 
• JFMCC components integration accomplished 
o Standardized applications within the portal framework  
o Information present within a browser-based application 
o Visibility in and across cells from any network access point 
 
• Needed developments: 
o Workflow automation applications 
o Compatibility of information and communication systems with portal interfaces 
o Improved search and retrieval functions 
o Reduction in the number of environments 
o TTP and training programs for CIE use 
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Joint Theater Anti-Missile Defense (JTAMD) #1 
 
The inherent mobility and flexibility of Naval forces constituted a unique joint capability and a force 
multiplier during the experiment. Navy ships protected critical assets on the Defended Assets List (DAL), 
augmented Patriot units, provided the lower tier component for Theater Phase High Altitude Defense 
(THAAD) system, and projected missile defense over amphibious landings ashore.  
 
Ships provided a key complement to Army Air Defense Artillery (ADA) surging to meet anticipated 
threats or to respond to other operational changes, while THAAD and PATRIOT batteries focused on the 




For the situations tested during the experiment, Navy forces appeared especially valuable for the 
following: 
 
• Terminal Phase TBMD: A robust terminal phase TBMD capability was critical to joint missile 
defense. Although extensive Army Air Defense Artillery (ADA) forces were in theater, Navy 
forces played a critical role defending designated critical assets either alone or in conjunction 
with sea-based mid-course defense (SMD), THAAD and PATRIOT. 
• Mid-Course TBMD: The contingency SMD capability was critical to achieving the Joint Task 
Force Commander’s (JTFC) desired probability of negation. Against longer-range threats the 
extensive defended footprint provided an upper tier component of a two-tiered defense for a large 




JTAMD #1 - Navy Forces Provide Significant Contributions To TAMD/TBMD. 
 
• Navy unique capabilities provide a JTAMD force multiplier:  
o Protected critical assets on the DAL 
o Augmented PATRIOT units 
o Provided the lower tier component for THAAD  
o Projected missile defense over amphibious landings  
o Provided a key complement to Army Air Defense Artillery 
 
• Critical support provided for:  
o Terminal phase TBMD 
o Mid-course TBMD 
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Joint Theater Anti-Missile Defense (JTAMD) #2 
 
The Air Defense Commander/Regional Air Defense Commander (ADC/RADC) was never fully 
integrated into AOC battle rhythm, and the organizational relationship between the Joint Forces Air 
Component Commander/Area Air Defense Commander (JFACC/AADC) and the ADC/RADC remained 
ambiguous. The absence of joint doctrine defining the role of a RADC and the lack of direct 
communication between the JFACC/AADC and the RADC most likely contributed to the difficulty. 
 
Attempts to develop coordinated engagement procedures when both Army and Navy missile defense 
forces covered common critical assets were unsuccessful. Doctrinal and technical differences between 
Army firing units and Navy ships formed a barrier and did not allow coordination beyond spatial 
deconfliction (“engagement zones”). Without changes to existing doctrine, systems, and operational 
concepts, dynamic battlespace coordination including integrated engagements will not be possible.  
 
Though it received less high-level attention than longer-range missiles, the threat posed by large numbers 
of relatively unsophisticated short-range missiles (<300 km) and artillery rockets was a significant factor 
in operational planning and caught many planners by surprise. Coordination between the DAADC and the 
maritime ADC/RADC was hindered, as existing planning tools did not include models for these threats 
and the numbers present required intense considerations of interceptor inventory. The widespread 
distribution of these types of weapons warrants increased consideration in operational planning.  
 
Collaboration was hindered when weapons system decision aid models did not yield common solutions, 
even with identical data input. For distributed collaboration to be effective, all participants must have a 




• Develop common TTP and joint doctrine that defines roles, missions, and responsibilities 
between functional component commanders and their subordinate commanders. 
• Develop models that can be used as tactical decision aids for short-range missile and artillery 
defense. 
• Develop models and decision aids that yield identical solutions when given the same inputs and 
implement their use across services. 
• Develop joint doctrine for cross-service JTAMD. 
JTAMD #2 – Current Limitations To Navy Joint TAMD/TBMD 
 
• Limitations experienced: 
o ADC/RADC was never fully integrated into Air Operations Center (AOC). 
o Unsuccessful integration of Army and Navy missile defense forces covering 
common critical assets. 
o Limited ability to handle the threat posed by large numbers of relatively 
unsophisticated short-range missiles and artillery rockets.  
o Weapons systems models in decision aids did not yield common solutions. 
 
• Required developments: 
o Common TTP and joint doctrine for roles, missions, and responsibilities 
between functional component commanders and their subordinate commanders.
o Tactical decision aid models for short-range missile and artillery defense. 
o Cross-service planning and tactical decision aids. 
o Develop joint doctrine for cross-service JTAMD.  
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Section II. Fleet Battle Experiment – Juliet: Background 
 
A complete description of Fleet Battle Experiment (FBE) Juliet and of FBE purpose and history can be 
found in the Reconstruction and Analysis Report. This section provides a brief, general context to lay a 
foundation for the initiative context specifics presented in the next section.  
 
FBE-J was carried out within the larger joint experiment Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02). MC02 had 
no impact on FBE-J other than to provide, at times, JFC initiation to operational and tactical actions 
through the ETO. Thus, there is no reference to MC02 in this report's results.  
 
A significant focus of FBEs has been the use of information to support both the tactical and operational 
levels of war. A primary goal has been to enable commanders to make fast, accurate planning and 
execution decisions. The range of information-related objectives has been broad, including battlefield 
situation, information accuracy, timeliness, dissemination and display, and the processes by which the 
information is used for decision making.  
 
FBEs involve live forces but make extensive use of simulations to minimize the expense of employing 
operational resources. It is especially valuable as a means to insert opposing forces into an operation. 
Simulation also permits playing some future systems, primarily weapons and sensors, by introducing their 
predicted performance into the simulation. FBE-J was a mix of live and simulated activities in order to 
examine real operational and tactical warfighting issues in a real environment. At times, the Navy 
simulation provided Red-force activities, at other times they were provided by MC02 simulations. 
 
The two major FBE-J experimentation areas were: 
 
• Sea Based Joint and Maritime Command and Control 
• Assured Access 
  
Sea Based Joint Command and Control was an opportunity presented by Commander Joint Task Force 
(CJTF) and Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) plans to base portions of their staffs afloat on 
the fleet command ship. FBE-J examined C4ISR information and support needs to fully enable joint 
command from a fleet command ship.  
 
The Assured Access scenario presented concurrent threats by submarines, mines, coastal cruise missiles, 
and enemy land and air assets. The joint environment and warfighting scenario presented an opportunity 
to experiment with maritime command and control across almost all maritime warfare areas in a difficult 
littoral environment. 
 
FBE-J was conducted from 24 July to 15 August 2002 in the US western sea and land ranges. It was 
conducted at the operational and tactical levels. The experiment setting time frame was 2007. This limited 
experimentation to those capabilities resident in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) in 2002 or 
those capabilities that could be reasonably achieved by 2007. 
 
FBE-J attempted to include almost every maritime warfare area. The scenario supported experimentation 
in strike, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, anti-surface warfare, information operations, naval fires, 
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Additional initiatives examined high-speed vessels; 
joint Fires, sea based command and control, coalition command and control, netted force, meteorology 
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Overview of FBE-J Activities  
 
Joint and Maritime Command and Control Activities 
 
Maritime Operational Planning Process  
Objective: Field-test the draft joint doctrine for JFMCC. 
Action: Refine the roles, functions and planning process for the Joint Force Maritime 
Component Commander. 
 
Sea-Based Joint Command and Control (C2) 
Objective: Lessons learned for doctrine, organization, training, manning, and technology 
in support of ship based Joint Command and Control. 
Action: Refine C4ISR and support for a sea based Joint Force Commander. 
 
Netted Force  
Objective: Provide lessons learned for development of expeditionary networks. 
Actions: Develop innovative solutions to the seams between forward based forces and 
rear echelon forces through exploration of innovative networking. Additionally, improve 
coalition information exchange using software agent based systems. 
 
FBE-J Naval Fires Network (NFN (X))  
Objective: Provide field-tested NFN TACMEMO for fleet use. Provide lessons learned 
for NFN converged architecture development. Provide lessons learned for joint doctrine, 
organizations, training, and manning when joint intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) assets can be shared and distributed across the CJTF. 
Actions: Assess Naval Fires Network-Experimental (NFN (X)) system and develop TTP 
and CONOPS to support sea-based Fires in a joint environment. Explore innovative 
linkage of NFN (X) to joint Fires network. Provide field-tested results for bandwidth, 
weapon-target pairing and deconfliction. 
 
Assured Access Activities 
 
Unmanned Sensors and Platforms  
Objective: Provide CONOPS leading to TACMEMOs for airspace, waterspace, and sea-
surface management; deconfliction; and asset optimization in a highly mixed manned and 
unmanned environment. Provide lessons learned for doctrine, organizations, training and 
manning based on use of manned and unmanned sensors and platforms. 
Actions: Refine the concepts of employment for distributed, networked, manned and 
unmanned platforms, and remote sensors, and for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) / anti 
surface warfare (ASUW) / mine warfare (MIW). 
 
Theater Air and Missile Defense  
Objective: Provide field-tested CONOPS leading to TACMEMO for Navy lower tier, 
Navy theater wide, and Navy Area Air Defense Commander module systems in a joint 
environment. Provide lessons learned for doctrine and organizations in use of these 
emerging systems. 
Action: Examine multi-mission pull and joint C2 of Navy TBMD capable units. 
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Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
Objective: Provide field-tested CONOPS and technological recommendations to mitigate 
seams between local and theater ASW efforts. 
Action: Examine coordination from theater ASW commander to local ASW commander, 
in integrating unmanned sensors and platforms with manned sensors and platforms. 
 
Anti- Surface Warfare (ASUW) 
Objective: Provide field-tested CONOPS leading to TACMEMO development or fleet 
use of joint and Navy assets versus the swarming small boat threat. 
Action: Examine joint tactical packages to counter swarming small boat threat. 
 
Mine Warfare (MIW) 
Objective: Provide field-tested CONOPS leading to TACMEMO development for fleet 
use of emerging mine warfare systems. 
Action: Refine concepts of employment for organic and dedicated MIW forces in assured 
access mission. 
 
Information Operations (IO) 
Objective: Determine if IO forward and JFMCC IO staff contribution were incorporated 
in the maritime planning process (MPP) and were sufficient/insufficient to produce the 
products, information, guidance or feedbacks necessary to construct an MTO. Where 
insufficient, determine contributors to lack of process, products, information, 
collaboration or control. 
Action: Integrate kinetic and non-kinetic engagement options to develop computer 
network defense CONOPS. Evaluate the impact of cross-component engagement network 
and supporting TTP. 
 
MC02 Activities  
 
Joint fires  
Objective: Provide recommendations for acquisition of system enabling coordination of 
joint fires across the CJTF. 
Action: Evaluate the impact of cross-component engagement network and supporting 
TTP. 
 
High Speed Vessel (HSV)  
Objective: Provide lessons learned for development of future Navy combatants and 
support vessels to include littoral support craft, logistics, and vessels. 
Action: Evaluate vessel speed, size, range, and endurance along with reconfigurable 
payload characteristics for assured access missions. Explore use of HSV for transport, 




The year is 2007. 
 
• Country Red sits astride a strategic waterway important to the world's economy. 
• A faction inside of country Red has seized islands in the waterway that belong to a neighboring 
nation and has interrupted the shipment of oil. 
• This interruption of international shipping has exacerbated existing world economic problems. 
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• Country Red has weapons of mass effect (WME) that it is using to threaten surrounding countries 
to prevent them from supporting any international efforts to reopen the waterway. 
• Setting (see Reconstruction and Analysis Report for a complete description). 
• Southwest US DoD training and weapons ranges represent country Red. 
• Portions of the southern California Navy operating area represent the critical waterway. 
• San Clemente Island, San Nicholas Island, Santa Barbara Island, and Santa Catalina Island 
represent islands seized by country Red in the critical waterway. 
• An imaginary peninsula outside of the islands contains Blue force support bases, 
joint forces, and both live and computer-simulated forces (see Reconstruction and Analysis Report for a 
complete description). 
 
• Navy – two carrier battle groups (CVBG) plus two amphibious ready groups (ARG)  
• USMC – Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) 
• Army – Airborne plus medium brigades 
• Air Force – Aerospace expeditionary force 




The overall Blue mission was to conduct rapid decisive operations to assure access through the strategic 
international waterway. The operations can be summarized as follows: 
 
• A pre-hostilities situation existed up through 27 July, during which both Red and Blue were 
positioning forces.  
 
• On 27 July, Red initiated hostilities by attacking the Tarawa Amphibious Ready Group transiting 
the straits and the Abraham Lincoln Battle Group.  
 
• From the 27th through the 29th the main effort was engagement of Red maritime forces and air 
strikes against critical Red C2 targets and TSTs.  
 
• On the 30th, the Joint Force executed a planned land assault on Red WME sites, including ship-to-
objective-maneuver (STOM). 
 
• Starting 2 August, the main effort shifted back to maritime access operations to support civilian 
tanker traffic through the straits to restore the flow of oil. 
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Millennium Challenge 02 
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Section III. Initiatives’ Context 
 
 
Data and information are obtained from an experiment under a set of conditions. Analysis results have 
known validity only for those conditions, their range of applicability. Specifying its range of applicability 
is as important as the result. We refer to "context" as the set of conditions that existed during the 
experiment. There is a hierarchy of conditions: 
 
• General conditions - are the overall setting under which the experiment was conducted. This was 
provided in the former section of this report. 
 
• Initiative conditions - are special conditions that were set up to meet the objectives of an 
initiative. 
 
• Results conditions - are special conditions that are pertinent to understanding a particular result. 
For example, an initiative condition could be use of short-dwell-time transporter / erector / 
launchers (TELs) for Fires capabilities testing. A particular result condition could be three TELs 
per 15 minutes, causing TCT prosecution to break down. Results conditions, if needed, are 
reported along with the principal results in the first section of this report.  
 
From a carefully designed experiment it may be possible to extract cause-and-effect. This can provide a 
model of the behaviors of systems and the processes within which the systems operate. Cause-and effect 
relations allow extending results to conditions other than those under which they were obtained. Two 
related conditions are necessary if an experiment is to produce cause-and-effect understanding: control of 
variables and change. Knowledge of variable states is necessary, and control of variables is preferred, in 
order to produce data for quantitative analyses. This is especially important for complicated experiments 
such as FBEs. 
 
One cannot observe the effects produced by a variable without changing it. All cause-and-effect 
relationships are "if this influence is applied, that happens". A force/influence being applied is a change in 
that variable, and the response is a change in state of the system of interest. A well-designed experiment is 
one that controls and changes a variable so as to observe a desired effect, under desired conditions. In 
experimental situations as complicated as FBEs, it is not always possible to control variables. Whether or 
not control can be exercised, it is necessary that everything that influences a result be recorded.  
 
An assessment of "experiment quality" is also needed. This is an expression of how well the experiment 
was designed to meet its stated objectives. FBEs consist essentially of many experiments within an 
overarching exercise/experiment. Initiatives are individual experiments. Because there is variability in 
how well individual initiatives are designed, an expression of experiment quality is needed for each.  
 
The next part of this section will be a description of the important facets of experiment quality. This is 
followed by context for each of the initiatives.  
 
Experiment Quality Condition  
 
Figure 2 illustrates experiment design principles for a particular initiative considering two parameters (A 
and B) that could influence the results. The initiative could be, for example, MIW, with parameter A 
representing target density, and parameter B the transit and operational speed of a mine clearance vessel. 
These are only two of the many possible parameters that establish experiment conditions. We use speed 





         





        
 
 










Figure 2. Representative Ranges of Parameters within an Experiment (notional).  
 
The notional experiment is to examine employment of an HSV as a mine warfare platform and determine 
its effectiveness for various speeds as a function of mine density. 
 
The solid box and ranges are conditions for which experimentation results are needed to satisfy the 
initiative objectives. Parameter B is vessel speed (10 to 40 knots), and parameter A is target density (10 to 
30 per square kilometer). 
  
The dashed box depicts the ranges of conditions under which the experiment was actually conducted (25 
to 55 knots, 15 to 45 per square kilometer).  
 
Points p, q, and r are conditions existing when data were obtained (p is operating at 35 knots against 15 
targets per square kilometer, etc). Experiment data are obtained at a particular time, under particular 
conditions. Point p could be early in the experiment, q later, and r towards the end. Changes in parameters 
A and B with time could be by design or by natural experiment evolution.  
 
The positions of the dashed box and conditions points p, q, and r show that the experiment was carried out 
only for high vessel speeds (or that data were collected or analysis done only for high speeds). Thus, the 
full objectives of the initiative (a wider range of speeds) were not met. 
 
Several observations can be made about the conditions points: 
 
• The difference in points p and q are due to a change in only target density. This may represent 
good experiment control, holding speed fixed.  
• The change in conditions from q to r is due to changes in both density and speed, which makes 
cause-and-effect difficult to determine. If an experiment purpose is to determine reasons for 
different results produced between conditions q and r, the experiment is poorly designed because 
influences due to changing both density and speed are mixed. One also needs data for density 
held fixed and speed varied, a point vertically above q.  
Range B 
Parameter B - speed 
Range A      
                 r   
         
 
    p       q     
Parameter A – target density 
p, q, r - realized experiment conditions 
Solid box - Initiative Space 
Dashed box - Experimentation Space 
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• A conditions point may represent several observations or results. If this is the case, statistical 
analysis can be performed for that set of results.  
• It is possible (likely) that conditions are not exactly the same for a set of results. The condition 
points would then cover a small area (or line if only one parameter varies). Whether or not such 
results are treated as having the same conditions is a matter of initiative definition.  
 
Subjective opinions (information rather than data) about experiment performance will often apply over a 
range of experiment conditions, perhaps the whole or some portion of the dashed box.  
 
If there is no overlap between the solid and dashed boxes, either or both experiment design or execution is 
poor. The objectives of the initiative will not be met. A statement of how well the two boxes overlap, the 
"quality" of the experiment, is part of initiative context. There are no quantitative measures for "quality" 
of experiment design or execution. Rather, a subjective statement is made about "quality" and an 
explanation for the reason(s) included. Experiment Quality is stated on a sliding scale: 
Very low Low  Marginal Good  Very good 
 
The fact that condition r is outside the design box is not necessarily an experiment flaw, however. It may 
actually be beneficial because it can provide results by the process of discovery.  
 
The variation of conditions with time, represented by p, q, and r being different, provide the opportunity 
to observe results changing in response to parameter changes. This is one potential source of information 
for determining cause-and effect. Especially unnerving, and of marginal use, are observed changes in 
results that cannot be associated with parameter changes. Such results represent poor experiment design 




New initiatives within the Department of Defense focus largely on three things: 
 
• Network centric operations – wherein critical information is accessible throughout the force. 
• Transformation – integrating new technology and innovative operations fostered by new 
technology into military operations to improve agility, effectiveness, and efficiency. 
• Joint operations – the ability for the military services to operate together seamlessly. 
 
The initial experiment plan for FBE-J, which was the foundation for subsequent planning, mentioned net-
centric, largely ignored transformation, and focused on joint capabilities. From subsequent plans through 
actual execution of Juliet, however, there was a distinct metamorphosis toward emphasizing and 
executing the initiatives toward: 
 
• More traditional and narrowly scoped military objectives, and  
• There was no injection of stress into operations execution. 
 
Thus, a sense of transformation was not achieved and critical real-world pressures that typically affect 
decision-making were absent. 
 
 
Initiative Context Descriptions  
 
The following provides context for each initiative, and characterizes experiment quality. Any needed 
conditions or details that are not contained in the general description in Section II are included here. 
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JFMCC Maritime Planning Process 
MPP context is the most difficult to describe of all initiatives. It is an evaluation of the effectiveness of a 
new process, one for which no definite data nor design conditions could be specified. The initiative was 
an exploration of what is needed to make the process work, and also one where what was learned was to 
be included in further development of the MPP as doctrine with included TTP. 
 
A statement of what was to be learned was posed as a question: "Does the JFMCC maritime planning 
process provide the structure, organization, management, feedback, optimization, and situational 
awareness to maritime force employment and support the intent of a joint effects tasking order (ETO)?" 
 
The contextual meaning of this question is whether or not the specified attributes exist in the MPP. 
Clarifying definitions of the attributes are: 
 
• Structure – information, knowledge, and decision structure relationships contributing to MPP 
system performance. 
• Organization – functional, personnel, and task relationships contributing to MPP system 
performance. 
• Management - the MPP operating as a C2 function, providing internal and external 
synchronization, and managing planning functions. 
• Feedback - feedback information of different kinds and levels, contributing to organization 
management and process control at the operational level. 
• Optimization – merging of battlespace situational awareness and asset planning to produce an 
optimized plan. 
• Situational Awareness – presentation of battlespace actions in a COP, within the context of the 
ETO, providing continual assessment of operational and tactical status. 
 
The following provides specific context for each attribute, followed by an experiment quality condition 
for the initiative as a whole, with an explanatory statement. 
 
Structure Context; focus on workflow information 
• A workflow tool was integrated technically but not into the process. 
• Course of analysis tools (e.g., Navy Simulation System) were not integrated. 
• InfoWorkSpace (IWS) was integrated into the process. 
• Knowledge management provided only web-space maintenance. 
  
Organization Context 
• Personnel assignment changes were made between spirals and experiment execution. 
• Insufficient training on systems, processes, and relationships was provided. 
• Relationships and organization could not be varied to observe effects. 
• Personnel and functional relationships, and their contributions, could not be well determined. 
 
Management Context 
• Technical interfaces for internal MPP coordination were in place. 
• Plan changes were implemented only at Maritime Operations Center. 
• Inadequate integration of tools and processes made it difficult to evaluate adequately the MPP as 
a C2 function. 
 
Feedback Context 
• Feedback from and to different levels of organization, process, and command was nearly absent. 
• Feedback on changes in battlespace environment was absent or little used. 




• Optimization software was not ready for the experiment; hence no results could be obtained. 
 
Situational Awareness 
• Briefings were used for shared understanding rather than the COP or distributed knowledge 
management. Information could not be obtained on use of knowledge systems for the MPP. 
 
MPP Experiment Quality Condition 
The quality of the experiment with respect to being able to obtain information that applied directly to 
stated objectives within the initiative was very low. However, if one accepts that a significant part of the 
reason for this initiative was to determine if the MPP could work and to provide guidance for future 
developments, the quality was good for illuminating difficulties and possible cures.  
 
A significant amount of detailed information emerged about process difficulties and means by which they 




The timely assessment and engagement of time sensitive targets (TSTs) across components poses 
challenges in establishment of a timely and accurate common operational picture (COP), effective 
collaboration across components, and timely integration of joint capabilities against the target. 
 
The overarching questions were: 
 
• Does the proposed (experimental) joint targeting (cross component) architecture enable timely 
engagements of TSTs?  
• In what ways does a common toolset within the joint architecture affect the ability of the joint 
force to conduct effective cross component TST operations?  
 
Timely engagements context 
• No means were available to capture the interval between the component identification of the 
target and the promotion of the target into the automated deep operations coordination system 
(ADOCS). 
• The dynamic target list (DTL) was unstable due to frequent updates.  
 
Contribution of architecture to cross-component engagements context 
• Training in the prescribed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) was inadequate. 
 
JFI Experiment Quality Condition  
The quality of the experiment with respect to being able to obtain information that applied directly to the 
stated objectives within the initiative was good. 
 
 
High Speed Vessel (HSV) 
The High Speed Vessel initiative, with both real (JOINT VENTURE, HSV-X1, Sea Slice) and simulated 
vessels, was to be an enabler of MIW and MC02 initiatives. In the FBE, these platforms were to provide 
the Mine Warfare Commander with a sensor platform and C4I platform. Within the context of MC02, 




A statement of what was to be learned was posed as a question: 
 
"What additional value added does having a number of high speed, reconfigurable, and multi-mission 
platforms provide the JFMCC and JFC in a littoral campaign as part of an access mission?"  
 
Specifically the desired added value was to contribute to support to the Mine Warfare Commander in 
planning and execution of a mine warfare campaign, support to naval special warfare operations, support 
in a ship-to-objective-maneuver, employment in an interim brigade team redeployment, and logistics 
support to deployed forces ashore. 
 
Context of HSV Contribution to MIWC Operational Planning and Execution 
• ISR management procedures and processes were not in place at multiple levels.  
• There was lack of feedback from previous missions. 
• There was insufficient familiarity with use of such a vehicle amongst high-level planners so its 
possible impact on operations and planning was not tested.  
 
Context of support to Naval Special Warfare Operation 
• Only whether the ship would physically support Special Operations personnel was tested.  
 
Context for Logistics Support to Deployed Forces Ashore 
• There was no "ownership" of the HSV asset because they were managed by placing them in a 
common pool.  
 
HSV Experiment Quality Condition  
This experiment was mainly to introduce the concept of using an HSV. This quality was good. The 
quality of the experiment for testing how to physically use the ship, such as how to reconfigure was also 
good. Determination of the effect on operations was poor. 
 
 
Naval Fires Network--Experimental (NFN(X)) 
NFN (X) implemented experimental Navy targeting systems and processes that supported joint targeting 
and Fires requirements across components, up to CJTF and down to tactical Naval Forces through defined 
CONOPS, TTP, systems architecture, and organization. Navy Fires projected power ashore through the 
integration of long-range surface, sub-surface, and air delivered Fires. 
 
The overarching questions guiding this initiative were: 
 
• What is the contribution of Naval platforms self-targeted engagements to the TST engagement 
problem?  
• What are the operational planning and employment considerations required for the effective 
utilization of future power projection platforms in the TST engagement process? 
• How successful is the defined TST architecture in engaging asymmetric TST targets?  
• How successful were Naval platforms in responding to multi-mission tasking? 
• What is the contribution of the mensuration manager to the TST process? 
• What will the introduction of a ground COP contribute to the TST process?  
 
Self-targeting context 
• Architecture prevented appropriate tests by requiring all target nominations to be centralized via 
the DTMS. 
• TTP also precluded testing by establishing rules of engagement that mandated that the MOC 
maintain TST authority. 
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Operational planning and employment context 
• Minimal weapon systems discriminators were included to differentiate these new systems from 
current systems. 
 
Asymmetric target engagement context 
• Major asymmetric attacks that were planned for simulation were by small boats in a SWARMEX, 
which was cancelled due to weather. Other smaller simulation-generated small boat attacks were 
executed, but did not represent the equivalent intensity of the larger exercise. 
• The weapon-target pairing system did not contain conventional arms to use against small boats.  
 
Multi-mission targeting context 
• There was minimal, if any, multi-mission targeting undertaken. 
• Multi-mission targeting systems (including personnel roles) were not pressured, so that the range 
of performance for these systems under stress could not be determined. 
 
Mensuration manager context 
• The mensuration tasks were not demanding enough to test adequately the system over a range of 
performance. 
• These systems were not tasked in a controlled manner to determine maximum capacity, thus no 
“management” of the mensuration assets was required. 
 
NFN (X) Experiment Quality Condition  
The quality of the NFN (X) initiative of FBE-J with respect to being able to obtain information that 
applied directly to stated objectives within the initiative was low. FBE-J did, however, produce a level of 
data for the mensuration process that was unprecedented in the history of FBEs. This permitted a detailed 
examination of the mensuration process and led to recommendations for improvements. 
 
 
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Management (ISRM) 
The Joint ISR concept of operations for MCO2 outlined a network-centric approach conducting joint-
force-wide ISR in which all ISR players will be linked by a collaborative command and control ISR 
(C2ISR) network. The underlying JFCOM hypothesis was that this collaborative linkage of all ISR 
players would enable coordinated execution of ISR operations that were widely distributed, while at the 
same time maintaining cohesion, coordination, and unity of effort. 
 
The overarching objective for FBE-J was to examine doctrinal implications and to refine the TTP for joint 
and maritime C2 and assured access. FBE-J experimented with the convergence of deliberate and 
dynamic ISR management, in support of joint force and component-specific ISR requirements, within the 
JFMCC construct. 
 
JFMCC ISR planning context 
• The ISR C2 architecture did not include a TST manager to validate targets. Decisions regarding 
assets allocation were based on operator perspective only. 
• TES-N could not create manual contacts due to software problems and TES-N contacts were not 
viewable on GCCS-M COP display. 
• There was no operationally sound interface to link TES-N and DTMS/RRF. 
 
Dynamic ISR management context 
• There was no consistent live air picture for correlation of link tracks with the ATO.  
• There was no graphic depiction of the synchronized ISR plan. 
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Distributed UGS and unmanned UAV context 
• The unattended ground sensors (UGS) system was not fully tested prior to the experiment. 
• Data were not made available from the contractor to establish accuracy of MIUGS tracks.  
• Weather (fog) precluded many flight operations for the Predators, which were the last link in the 
delivery of munitions to targets identified by the UGS. When Predator was available, MIUGS 
tracks were not transmitted to the STWC, and when the communications systems worked, the 
UAVs were unavailable. 
 
Multi-platform SIGINT context 
• Networked Specific Emitter Identification (SEI) was tested under reasonable battle scenario 
conditions. 
 
ISRM Experiment Quality Condition 
The quality of the experiment for obtaining information that applied directly to stated objectives was low. 




It is likely over the near-term, that the littoral seas will become increasingly important and challenging for 
maritime and joint forces to access quickly and safely. New platforms such as high speed vessels (HSVs), 
and technological advances in sensor capabilities increase the organic MCM capability and present the 
MIWC with new challenges and opportunities in organization, resource allocations, information 
management, and C2. 
 
As a first step in dealing with these new realities, the MIW experiment in FBE-J was to examine the 
application of network centric warfare concepts and other emerging technologies as they might apply to 
mine warfare and to determine how they could enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of mine warfare. 
HSVs were to be assessed as MCM sensor support and management platforms, and an examination was 
to be done of the integration of MIW with NFN, and the MIW use of the common undersea picture 
(CUP). 
 
HSVs as MCM sensor support and management context 
• HSV operations were independent of JFMCC requirements and decisions. Planning was internal 
to the ship and could not be related to the MPP.  
 
MIW integration with NFN context 
• It is unknown whether mine contacts were valid physical realities. Reconstruction is required 
before this initiative can be evaluated.  
 
MIW use of the common undersea picture (CUP) context 
• MIW CUP and ASW CUP were independent, so no examination of a common picture can be 
made.  
 
MIW Experiment Quality Condition 
Overall quality of the experiment was marginal because of an inability to match needed experiment 







Because the naval contribution to rapid decisive operations requires assured access, ASW forces are 
required to establish zones of operations free of enemy submarines. To do this effectively, the forces are 
forced to employ network centric ASW operations. This is the concept of multi-level commands and 
multi-disciplinary forces that are well connected by common communications, doctrine, planning tools 
and commander's guidance. In order to improve detection, classification, localization, and neutralization 
of enemy submarines, these commands must possess the ability to: 
 
• Rapidly share information. 
• Correlate their situational awareness as it pertains to the larger operational and tactical pictures. 
• Conduct distributed, collaborative planning and self-synchronize their actions with other joint or 
coalition ASW platforms.  
 
The primary issue formed as a question was:  
 
“How can network centric ASW operations improve detection, classification, localization and 
neutralization of enemy submarines to assure maritime access?” 
 
Submarine locating devices context 
• The ASW commander had no control over the frequency of these reports. 
 
Remote autonomous sensors context 
• Virtually all of the RAS initiative C2 procedures and processes were devoted to simulating the 
autonomous distributed sensor (ADS) fields and autonomous USVs.  
• USV technical difficulties precluded successful observations. 
 
Experimental common undersea picture (X-CUP) context 
• Parts of the undersea picture resided in several different, un-integrated systems. 
• Loss of satellite communications caused the loss of the network.  
 
ASW Experiment Quality Condition 




This initiative was to develop specific functional responsibilities for each IO forward billet to ensure 
maximum enrichments to all dimensions of JFMCC operations. IO rear critical support billets and 
functions were to be identified. Four IO sub-initiatives were incorporated in the experiment to investigate 
emerging organizational constructs, processes and capabilities to support JTF and JFMCC processes with 
a full range of IO options.  
IO enrichment to the JFMCC planning process context 
• Originally, 28 billets were identified in joint doctrine to populate the IO cell, but the actual 
manning was a less than adequate 11 people (inclusive of two each, USAF and USA liaison). 
• JFMCC maintained tactical control over individual units, effectively eliminating the need for the 
IWC.  
• The MTO was not designed to accept missions without targets, such as typical in IO actions. 
• PWCs were removed from consistent JFMCC interaction and they lost touch with all dynamic 




Collaborative IO planning context 
• The JFMCC did not have an information warfare planning capability, which is required for 
integrating, synchronizing, and optimizing IO weapons with kinetic and non-kinetic maritime 
operations. 
• The presence of readily prepared operational net assessments (ONAs) largely minimized the 
opportunity to explore the full possibility of timely, extensive IWPC utility and potential. 
• IO staff was largely forced to rely on ONA database vice real world information, so targeting did 
not use IWPC data. 
• An insufficient number of workstations forced collaboration to be face-to-face or via telephone 
rather than via the CIE, restricting data collection opportunities. 
 
Offensive IO context 
• IO weapons were not integrated into the simulation (SIM) federation. 
• E-strike weapons were not loaded into the theater battle management core system (TBMCS). 
 
 
Information Operations Experiment Quality Condition  
Testing of the concept of including the IO Commander into the planning process was good. Testing of 
defensive IO capabilities was good especially for initial methods and a way ahead, overall development 




The Netted Force Initiative focused on knowledge processes, use of collaborative tools, and supporting 
organizational structures. There were three sub-initiatives: knowledge management organization (KMO) 
(use of KMO to support JFMCC and battle-staff), collaborative information environment (CIE) (technical 
systems to support rapid decisive operations (RDO)), and ground common operational picture (COP) 
(links between traditional COP track management, engagement tools, target management, and intelligence 
order of battle tools). Each of the sub-initiatives was to document or define the KMO contribution to: 
 
• Commander's situational awareness 
• Decrease in information overload 
• Bandwidth management in support of combat operations 
 
KMO sub-initiative context 
• The contribution of KMO to information management was secondary to the technical aspects of 
information communications. Data capture was at a lower level than originally envisioned. 
• Active bandwidth management was not implemented. 
 
Context for CIE sub-initiative 
• Shared Point Portal System (SPPS) interface was used for collaboration.  
• LAWS/ADOCS were proprietary systems and difficult to integrate with SPPS or JFMCC 
applications, although some displays were transitioned to other systems. 
 
Netted Force Experiment Quality Condition 
The overall quality of the initiative was marginal, and the CIE sub-initiative was good. Greater 






Joint Theater Air Missile Defense (JTAMD) 
In the future, Navy theater air and missile defense (TAMD) capability will be hosted as one of the multi-
functional capabilities onboard surface combatants. Navy planners will be required to balance joint 
(critical asset defense) and maritime (force protection and access) requirements and effectively and 
optimally employ limited numbers of ships in a dynamic battlespace environment. FBE Juliet simulated 
the dynamic interactions necessary to assist in developing a Joint TAMD/AAW TACMEMO.  
 
The overarching questions to be addressed were: 
• Can a single commander appointed as the Battle Force Air Defense Commander (ADC or "AW") 
and a Regional Air Defense Commander (RADC) supported by the AADC module planning 
capability and process effectively support the air and missile defense requirements of both 
commanders? 
• Does the capability to rapidly wargame alternative courses of action with the embedded 
wargaming (M&S) capability and provide graphic displays provide value added to the Joint Force 
Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) and Joint Forces Air Component Commander 
(JFACC)? 
• What emerges as functional relationships between JTFHQ (and production of the effects tasking 
order and/or the defended asset list), the JFMCC (maritime tasking order) and JFACC/AADC (air 
tasking order)? 
• What emerges as the organizational relationship between the SJTFHQ theater missile defense 
(TMD) cell, JFACC/AADC, Deputy Area Air Defense Commander (32nd AAMDC), Regional 
Air Defense Commanders (RADC) and the maritime Air Defense Commander? 
• What elements of the experimental organization, TTP and C2 learned from this event are suitable 
for inclusion in a future USN AADC module TACMEMO? 
• Did the JFMCC maritime planning process mitigate the dilemma posed by competing demands 
for multi-purpose surface combatants? 
 
Balancing requirements between joint and maritime responsibilities context 
• Focus was primarily on joint responsibilities. 
• There was little demand for assets to support maritime needs, thus competition was not exercised. 
 
Optimal employment context 
• There was little to no competition for multi-mission ship resources so optimization, which would 
typically occur in times of over-commitment, could not be analyzed. 
 
Single commander context 
• The C2 structure was not predefined as part of TTP. 
• Role and responsibilities of the RADC were not well documented; complicating plans execution 
of plans and attainment of experiment goals. 
• The RADC/ADC was not integrated into the AOC or battle rhythm. 
 
Demands on multipurpose ship context 
• Without multiple, and conflicting, demands for support, it was not possible to analyze and draw 
conclusions. 
 
Functional and organizational relationships context 
• The relationships of the major commanders had to be structured informally and refined during the 
experiment, because there was no formal joint architecture for C2. 
• FBE-J did not stress the relationships with conflicting, time-critical demands on resources; thus, it 
was not possible to predict the ultimate endurance or success of the informal relationships. 
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The quality of the TAMD initiative of FBE-J with respect to being able to obtain information that applied 
directly to stated objectives within the initiative was marginal. However, the simulations of FBE-J 
provided a rich environment for constructing a joint architecture for missile defense, producing a good 




Section IV: FBE Experimentation Status and Recommendations 
 
General Status  
 
Fleet Battle Experiments provide an opportunity to develop and test new processes and systems in an 
operational environment. Real operators use real systems in an environment that is as close to actual 
warfare as can be achieved. There is no other experimental environment in which full operational testing 
with Navy personnel in the loop can be accomplished.  
 
By their nature operational field experiments are large, complex, expensive events. Planning and 
executing them requires the efforts of many organizations and many people over an extended period of 
time. Because of the required effort and expense, there is a natural tendency to try to accomplish as much 
as possible and to include as many study areas as possible, in order to have a high payoff.  
 
There is no question that this type of experimentation is required. However, the question has been asked 
whether the current emphasis on FBEs is the best means for obtaining the information desired.  Recently 
the NWDC warfare innovation development teams (WIDTs) have shifted emphasis to a broader range of 
experimentation venues which would have FBEs as culminating events, when needed. What this range of 
events will be depends on individual initiatives and is currently under development.  
 
The evaluation of an experiment's conduct is a required part of experimentation reporting, and it logically 
includes recommendations for future experimentation. The following discussion of experimentation 
conduct draws on the experiences of Juliet and other FBEs. It addresses the broad range of 
experimentation the WIDTs are considering. The focus is on proper experimentation process rather than 
on an evaluation of whether or not these processes have been followed in Juliet or preceding experiments. 
It is the case that the shear effort needed to physically conduct FBEs has prevented adequate attention to 
these processes.  
 
Experimentation Roadmap  
 
Defining an experimentation program logically proceeds by: 
 
• Define the learning objectives 
• Determine the events (workshops, war games, T&E, experiments of all types) necessary to meet 
those objectives 
• Lay out a plan that includes a coherent sequence of events 
• Execute the events needed to build a body of knowledge 
• When sufficient background knowledge is produced, execute an operational experiment, if 
needed. 
 
The process above recognizes that operational experiments are but one learning tool, rather than and end 
in themselves. This would undoubtedly reduce the frequency of FBEs and also introduce many Limited 
Objective Experiments (LOEs). LOEs would focus on a single initiative, or perhaps two, and use a 
smaller number of operational units.  
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Total-System Analysis  
 
Experimentation needs to concentrate on the total system. There is currently too much emphasis on 
hardware system performance and not enough on processes within which those systems operate. The 
"total system" is made up of: 
 
• Hardware components 
• Systems of hardware components 
• Information structures 
• Command structures 
• Decision processes 
• TTP 
• Human machine interactions 
• Human factors, including training 
 
In addition there are factors that have to do with the fact that a military operation is being investigated: 
 
• Red and Blue objectives 
• Red-Blue physical interactions 
• Red-Blue psychological and political interactions 
 
Experiment design needs to consider the "fitness" of all of these factors with learning objectives, and the 
analyses by which results may be determined. 
 
The idea of "fitness" between concept, objective, execution, and evaluation (all within a total-system 
perspective) has additional pieces, e.g., the role of high-level concepts (e.g., network centric warfare), 
simulation, systems architecture, and various relations with data collection and analysis. 
 
FBEs have experienced mismatches between experiment plan (EXPLAN) expectations and the realities of 
experiment design. Assumptions are made in the initiative definition that find their way into experiment 
planning without the benefit of experiment design, or the practicalities of what is physically possible to be 
known from the experiment. Such mismatches tend to continue as part of the planning process until 
handed off to data collectors with an expectation that analysis will produce the intended learning. There 
must be instituted close coupling between experiment definition, its design, achievable analysis, and data 
required by those methods. Current FBE planning methodology does not include this coupling. 
 
Network-Centric Warfare/Information Management 
 
Network-centric warfare contains several basic concepts, three of which are especially pertinent to work 
that has been done in FBEs. 
 
• All pertinent battlefield information can reside in a common system (COP). 
• This information can be made available to all participants in an operation. 
• Decision quality will be improved by having this information available. 
 
The realization of these concepts requires a different approach to data, information, knowledge accession, 
maintenance, and distribution, yet the systems and processes in Juliet and other FBEs tend to be 
straightforward extensions of the past. 
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FBE-J results demonstrate that more attention is needed toward providing information that is relevant to a 
particular task and on designing new decision processes that recognize the new information environment. 
A significant shift from systems to processes is needed. 
 
Transformations of concepts that are occurring: 
 
• From a common "picture" to a common database from which information is drawn. 
• From "common" information to information that is relevant to performing a task. 
• From common displays to presenting information in a way that is task pertinent. 
• From fitting information to processes to redesigning processes around information. 
 
Achieving this transformation requires intelligent agents to fuse and sort information. It also requires 
developing processes that fit the new information environment, which can probably only be done by 





Simulation is used to provide event stimulation of FBEs. This is required for a variety of good reasons. 
The underlying physics for events reside in the simulation. From a total system understanding point of 
view, one cannot adequately analyze experiment events without having a complete understanding of what 
is occurring in the simulation. However, this level of understanding is not available to those analyzing 
FBEs. There are two issues: 
 
• Reconstruction of events is an analysis imperative that requires simulation and live action data. 
Experiment objectives should define the kinds of reconstruction required, and the objectives must 
be engineered prior to the experiment. Data extraction from simulation (e.g., joint semi-
automated forces (JSAF) or the high level architecture of which it may be part) must be built in as 
part of the simulation system requirements.  
• Understanding events requires knowing their underlying physics, in this case the physics modeled 
into the simulation. For example, is weapon-target interaction based on an extended range guided 
munitions (ERGM) or a Tomahawk; does a sensor's probability of detection depend on foliage; 
etc.? The level of understanding of the simulation physics and rules required for analysis is not 




There is a tendency to bring systems into an FBE with an incomplete overall architecture design. 
Nonetheless, the systems perform fairly well. However, inconsistencies do emerge during an experiment 
and they can obscure the information one is trying to gather. FBEs need a master architect, who has 
appropriate authority, and focuses not only on whether systems will work together but also on whether the 




Each FBE initiative requires significant amounts of data and information in order to perform adequate 
analyses. As experiments have moved toward more rapid uses of information, it has become increasingly 
necessary to acquire data electronically in order to track processes. It has been difficult to acquire all 
needed data. This applies to both simulation data (stated above), and transaction data (e.g., the electronic 
data from systems such as the Land Attack Warfare System (LAWS)). FBE priorities need to place 
capturing adequate electronic data near the top. 
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Data collection should be as automated as possible. All data should be regularly transported to a central 
site and copied to another site so that there is some measure of insurance against loss. Problems exist with 
having data stored on PCs that are then shipped to various organizations across the country, necessitating 
a special effort to re-acquire the data, always with the potential that this effort may not be successful. 
 
Besides the "fitness" described above, there are engineering standards and best practices that should be 
followed, such as pre-experiment testing. Although the spiral structure of FBE Juliet provided some 
opportunity to perform testing, it could not make up the entire differential between immature systems and 
experiment execution. At best, the final spiral event pre-FBE Juliet was an opportunity to wring out 
possible threads that might be activated in execution. This was not the correct forum to engineer systems 
into proper performance. Those activities should have been accomplished in the process leading each 
system towards successful performance in the FBE. 
 
Process and Decision Structure Testing  
 
In keeping with the net-centric approach, much FBE effort has been expended on the use of information 
for rapid decision-making, with Fires as a major thrust. Adequate testing should include stressing the 
process. To date, FBEs have dealt with environments that are not target rich or do not have large numbers 
of targets to deal with in a short time. Thus, it is not known what performance parameters will be under 
those circumstances, which are critical in actual combat. 
 
Engineering Support  
 
Complete planning, engineering, and testing of systems needs to be done before trying to demonstrate 
possible functionality in an FBE. Several FBE-J initiatives relied on or evaluated equipment that failed. 
Examples include the micro-netted unattended ground sensors (MIUGS), ASW remote autonomous 
sensors (RAS), and knowledge kinetics (K2), a work-flow software program that at the technical level 
was successful, but was not integrated in processes to actually do the job it was intended to do. Because 
many initiatives are predicated on the successful operation of equipment or sensor suites, or integration of 
new software (as in the case of K2) new equipment should be given sensibly exhaustive checkouts 
beforehand so there will be reasonable certainty that it will work as advertised when it is expected to be 
operating during the experiment. 
 
It has been argued (incorrectly) that while systems, technology, processes or software may not perform; 
the experiment concept is not at risk. In other words, the thought is expressed that there is autonomy 
between concept and the means to learn more about that concept in an experiment. This is a faulty notion. 
While it may in fact be true that the piece of hardware or software, or perhaps even the system is not the 
point of the experiment, furthering the concept (which is the point) cannot be accomplished in the face of 
inadequate performance of supporting equipment. 
 
ISRM MIUGS and the ASW RAS are examples that warrant description to better illustrate this point. As 
yet, there is no agreement on MIUGS performance emerging from the experiment. Characterizing this 
performance is a necessary component to modeling and supporting the larger concept of which this is a 
part. A thorough check of sensor performance and communication links beforehand would have 
eliminated problems and enhanced what was learned. For the ASW system, robo-skis were understood to 
be a difficult platform on which to place very sensitive sensors, which were designed for stationary 
employment. In another ASW example, modifications to DICASS buoys for use with helicopters moved 
the power source too far from the transducer for adequate performance. Thus, neither experiment could be 
said to adequately support the concept of autonomous sensor employment. Nor was parameterization for 
further experimentation obtained. All three systems could have been matured and tested prior to 
STARTEX in order to achieve a higher order of success. In addition, fielding the deficient systems during 
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an FBE did not provide good data on how to improve the systems, thus representing a waste of effort and 
resources. 
 
There are other factors in the complex interrelations of these experiments that are not adequately 
addressed, but would contribute to overall context and performance. An example is the role of logistics. 
 
Logistics Metrics  
 
FBEs are not realistic in terms of logistics or the use of assets, which leads to artificial or unrealistic 
results. Simulation provides most of the event stimulation necessary to engage experiment systems and 
processes. However, there is very little feedback that incorporates use of metrics to account for logistics 
and expenditures, i.e., how long resupply would take, how many missiles are available in a particular 
ship. In addition to the tracking of expenditures, the quality of those expenditures is not considered. For 
example, if Harpoon missiles were used to destroy motor whaleboats the action would represent a 
tremendous asymmetry in values and a potential future opportunity cost, thus it would be an unrealistic 




Past FBE analyses have suffered from a lack of continuing participation by the initiative leads, concept 
definers, principal participants, observers, and analysts. To date, the only group engaged in all three 
phases of experimentation (planning, execution, analysis and reporting) is the data collection and analysis 
group, which has not included leads from planning. Post-experiment dialogue should include the entire 
group to determine what events took place, produce a narrative of the interactions, come to consensus on 
context that impacted results, and determine what is necessary for final reconstruction, analysis, and 
reporting. Quicklook reporting does not provide the necessary forum for this dialogue and provides 
neither cause and effect analyses nor quantitative conclusions. 
 
• It is highly recommended that all principal participants in each of the initiatives be retained for all 
three phases of the experiment, not just the first two. 
 
Scope of Complex Experimentation 
 
It is likely that the Navy would find value in narrowing the focus of the complex experiments, which will 
also include “not to interfere” demonstrations. Rather than try to do many things, at great expense and 
with insufficient designers, observers, or analysts, it would be better to focus on only a few initiatives and 
do them very well. There must be assurance that this limited number of objectives are all well designed 
(with overall priorities and the ultimate analysis in mind), thoroughly observed and documented, and 
comprehensively analyzed. Additionally, each formal Fleet Battle Experiment should be part of a 
continuing mosaic, designed to build mounting improvement in capability beginning with the highest 
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